Why Denver LR's Transit Oriented Development efforts failed

T-REX Transit Oriented Development
Lessons Learned Report

September 2007

Regional Transportation District


Project Conducted By:
Bill Sirois, RTD


Catherine Cox Blair, City and County of Denver

Jerry Jaramillo, Kiewit Construction


With support from:
Gideon Berger, RTD

Kiewit Construction and FMI

Perspective:
When FasTracks passed in November 2004, a lot of attention was directed to the T-REX project
for understanding the dynamics that occurred in the planning and development of TODs
associated with the 14 total LRT stations. With FasTracks proposing about 55 new LRT stations
into the eight county area along 119 miles of rail track, it was logical to ask what lessons could
be learned from T-REX that could be applied towards benefitting this new major endeavor. Bill
Sirois with RTD, Catherine Cox-Blair with the City and County of Denver and Jerry Jaramillo
with Kiewit Construction met to strategize how to acquire such valuable information from key
stakeholders of the T-REX project. It was decided to develop and disseminate a survey to those
select stakeholders, accumulate and asses the information collected then conduct a workshop to
discuss the results. The process proved extremely valuable. The data assembled provides an
excellent foundation toward better planning and implementation of TODs for the FasTracks
corridors. The result of this partnering effort between both the public and private sector is the
information shared in this report.
















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INTRODUCTION
The Transportation Expansion Project (T-REX) was the largest multi-modal transportation
infrastructure project in the history of Colorado. By many measures, T-REX was immensely
successful: it was completed ahead of schedule and within budget, it marked the first occasion in the nation when a regional transit agency and a state department of transportation agreed to share responsibility for a transportation project, and it helped create public sentiment for passage of the FasTracks ballot initiative in 2004.

The T-REX project coincided with an immense amount of real estate development occurring
along the corridor. This was not surprising considering that the Southeast Corridor connects the
two major employment centers in the Denver metro area: the downtown Denver Central
Business District, and the Southeast Business District, which includes the Denver Tech Center,
Greenwood Village, Inverness, Meridian, and the city of Centennial. According to the Denver
Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), more than 180,000 people work in these two
employment centers, and another 30,000 or so work along the corridor, including businesses
along Colorado Boulevard, Evans Avenue, and University Boulevard. Forecasters expect
downtown and the Denver Tech Center to continue to grow during the next 20 years.

The development projects along T-REX have often been described as transit-oriented
development (TOD). In general, TOD has the following (but not all) development principles: it
has a functional relationship to transit, usually expressed through a strong pedestrian orientation
in contrast to the auto-dominated orientation of sprawl-pattern development; it is more compact
and denser than adjacent development; it has a mix of uses that provide for 18-hours of human
activity. The influence area of TOD usually extends to a radius of one-quarter to one-half mile
(a 5- to 10-minute walk) from a transit facility, depending on the context of the surrounding
environment.

Purpose of Report
Learning from the successes and challenges related to TOD along the Southeast Corridor will be invaluable for FasTracks corridors to ensure that TOD opportunities are truly realized. This report documents the thoughts and recommendations for improvement on the TOD process for the T-REX project from key stakeholders who were involved in the project from the early
planning through construction. This report is intended to provide guidance on what was learned about the TOD process on the T-REX project so that the Denver Metro area can truly take
advantage of the current enthusiasm and excitement regarding TOD.

Project Description and History
The T-REX project was a multimodal project which included the addition of light rail along the I-25 corridor as well as widening of the interstate highway. Specific details of the light rail and highway widening elements included:

• 19.7 miles of new, double-track light rail: 15.2 miles from the current Broadway station
to a new station at Lincoln Avenue in Douglas County, and 4.5 miles along I-225 to
Parker Road
• Thirteen new light rail stations


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• Widening of I-25 from 3 to 4 lanes in each direction between Logan Avenue and I-225
and from 3 to 5 lanes in each direction between I-225 and C-470.
• Reconstruction of a number of interchanges and bridges along the corridor.













































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The history of rapid transit in the Southeast Corridor spans several decades beginning in the
early 1980s when the concept was first explored. A timeline of milestones related to the T-REX project is identified below beginning with the completion of the Southeast Corridor Major
Investment Study in 1997.
• 1997 - Major Investment Study completed resulting in the adoption of light rail in the
Denver Regional Council of Government’s fiscally constrained regional transportation
plan (RTP).
• November 1999 - Voters approved two separate ballot initiatives that allowed for the
issuance of bonds to fund T-REX. With the entire project funding in place T-REX was
able to move forward as a design-build project allowing for the completion of the project
as a whole rather than in segments.
• December 1999 - Final environmental impact statement (EIS) completed
• March 2000 - Record of Decision signed by Federal Transit Admistration (FTA) and
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) making T-REX eligible for federal funding.
• November 2000 - Full Funding Grant Agreement approved by FTA providing T-REX
$525 million in New Start funds for the construction of light rail.
• Fall 1999 - May 2001 - Design-build contractor procurement process which started with
the development of a Request for Proposals (RFP) and ended with the selection of
Southeast Corridor Constructors (SECC), a joint venture between Kiewit Construction
and Parsons Transportation Group, to design and build the $1.67 billion project (of which
$879 million was for light rail).
• June 2001- December 2003 - Final design phase
• June 2001 - September 2006 - Construction of T-REX.
• September 2006 - Completion of all highway related construction for the corridor.
• November 2006 - Opening of the light rail portion of the corridor.

TOD Lessons Learned Workshop
The T-REX project’s major stakeholders conducted a forum in May 2006 to determine what
could be learned about implementing TOD in the Denver region from their experience—
especially how it could provide lessons for the future FasTracks corridors—keeping in mind the caveats that made T-REX a unique project: the post-dot.com and post-9/11 real estate market,
the development context of an interstate highway corridor, and the proximity of the Tech Center employment base.
Perspectives were solicited from a wide array of project stakeholders—the project owner, local
government jurisdictions, contractors, consultants, and developers—on the positives and
opportunities for improvement during each phase of the project, as well as regarding the sharing of information and the different roles of their respective parties. A list of project stakeholders
involved in the workshop forum and follow-up interview process is included in the Appendix of this report. Responses were compiled by project phase: the planning and Environmental Impact Statement; development of a request for proposals and contractor solicitation and procurement;
project design, which occurred somewhat concurrent with construction under the design-build
process; and actual construction.



5






WORKSHOP SUMMARY
The responses below came from participants at the May 18, 2006 T-REX TOD Lessons Learned
Workshop. Appendix A provides a list of workshop participants. Project consultants, owners,
contractors, local jurisdictions, and the development community were asked to cite the positives
and opportunities for improvement during each phase of the project, as well as regarding the
sharing of information and the different role of their respective parties. The information from the
workshop was supplemented by individual interviews with stakeholders who where unable to
participate.

Overall Factors Influencing TOD
Despite all the development now occurring in the Southeast Corridor, there are some general
overall factors that had a negative influence on the success of TOD that were outside of the
control of the stakeholders involved in the process. The first factor was that although the EIS
process was initiated in 1998 (and the MIS started as long ago as 1995), funding for T-REX was not secured until the passage of the two bond initiatives in November 1999, just four months
before the FTA’s Record of Decision accepting the final EIS. Until it had a local funding source, T-REX was just another in a long list of transportation plans with an uncertain likelihood for
implementation. Local government jurisdictions face many planning priorities (particularly in
this part of the Denver region, which included some of its fastest-growing communities at the
time) but have only limited financial and human resources. In addition, some developers and
property owners were uncertain of the reality of the project which negatively influenced the
prioritization of resources for the planning and design of TOD.
The second factor was the commercial real estate market. The dot-com bust began eroding the regional office market in 1999, which had a big impact on the Denver Tech Center, and was exacerbated just two years later by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Just as the local jurisdictions began to turn their attention to T-REX, the development community entered a period of
retrenchment due to the large number of job losses in metro Denver, which translated into high vacancy rates along the I-25 corridor office market.
By the time the market began to rebound, other factors dulled RTD’s and SECC’s collective
appetite for changes to the project to accommodate real estate development: T-REX was fiscally constrained by the FTA-approved budget, the design-build process discouraged changes to plans late in the game, and the focus and expertise of the project owners and contractors was on
transportation infrastructure, not vertical development.

Finally, at the time T-REX was initiated in the late 1990s there was a general lack of
understanding about TOD in the metro Denver market. There was a lack of TOD examples
regionally and nationally which contributed to the ability of market to respond to the
opportunity. There was little understanding of what the TOD opportunities were. Since 1999,
TOD has become much more mainstream in the real estate community and has been cited by
organizations like the Urban Land Institute as one of the hottest real estate trends in the future.





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EIS and Planning Phase
A significant effort was made by the project team (RTD, CDOT, and the EIS consultant team), to reach out to specific stakeholders and developers during the project planning phase. For
example, there were many discussions between the project team and property owners around
some of the stations with an interest in development. Small changes were made to the EIS after receiving developer input.
Some local jurisdictions, particularly the City and County of Denver, were proactive about
planning for TOD. A basic level of station area planning was completed in conjunction with the EIS for stations within Denver. However, only one plan was formally adopted by Denver and that did not occur until well after the completion of the EIS.
Participants in the workshop, however, listed many opportunities for improvement in this phase
of the project. A major point was the need to maximize environmental clearance in the EIS
phase to preserve future flexibility. Participants felt that locations for stations, bus and parking
facilities were essentially a “done deal” too early in the process. RTD and CDOT felt pressure to
“lock down” the design prior to the release of the RFP for the design-build contractor to prevent
the contractor from value engineering urban design features and other station elements. Design
by the project team was taken to the 90 percent level for station elements including parking, bus
bays, platforms, and shelters where as most of the other project elements that were provided to
the contractor were only designed to a 30 percent level. This resulted in limited flexibility in
being able to make design changes to support TOD options without requiring change orders or
even re-opening the environmental process. Some participants would have also liked to have
seen more emphasis on TOD in the scope of the EIS and more TOD area expertise on the EIS
team.
Despite the outreach made during the EIS, participants cited the need for more participation by
the development community and adjacent property owners. While RTD and CDOT could not
force any of these stakeholders to the table, the local jurisdictions could have used their voice, or
even their regulatory leverage, to encourage more early collaboration. Furthermore, if the local
jurisdictions had created and adopted land-use plans for the station areas, those would have been
acknowledged and referenced in the EIS, and informed the project design. In the absence of
adopted plans or even the initiation of a public planning process by the local jurisdiction, the
project team in some instances made the error of developing TOD concepts without coordinating with all the local landowners.
Contractor Solicitation and RFP Phase
Understanding of TOD was part of the RFP evaluation criteria. However RTD did not have any full-time TOD staff so there was limited specific language included in the RFP related to how TOD should be addressed. In addition, there was limited TOD experience regionally in Denver to really draw on for specific direction for how to address TOD in the RFP.

A major opportunity for improvement identified for this phase was establishing a process for
dealing with TOD that is clearly outlined in the RFP with complete buy-in from the transit
agency and local jurisdictions. This process should have been crafted with input from
developers. Another key opportunity for improvement is to strategically pull out certain park-n-


7






Rides where there is significant TOD opportunity from the project contractor’s scope of work, to retain as much flexibility as possible for how the site could develop. As one respondent pointed out, “Design-build can work, but the degree of complexity with specific sites may warrant
extracting them from the design-build contract and handled separately.”

The feasibility of this option would be impacted by whether federal funds are involved in site
acquisition, how the site was portrayed in the EIS, and the timing of any joint development so
that the parking piece at least would be operational for the opening of revenue service. As part
of the aforementioned procedure, there would need to be an established protocol and budget for
paying for such changes. However, it should be understood that construction costs may be
higher in this situation because individual stations would have to bid out separately from the
design-build contract. Also, a “drop dead” date for TOD-related changes needs to be established
early to ensure that essential station elements are completed by the start of revenue service.

Final Design Phase
The project team clearly communicated the expectations for responsibility for design changes, which rested with the local jurisdiction and/or the developer. For example, Greenwood Village paid over $7 million to relocate the park-n-Ride for Arapahoe Station since it was a change to design. There would have been less cost impact from design changes if some park-n-Rides had been pulled out of the design-build project.
Keeping the cost implications in mind, participants also said the project team and SECC
demonstrated flexibility in making changes to improve TOD potential at various sites. Also, local jurisdictions became much more engaged during this phase of the project; once plans are drawn up, it is easier to get stakeholders engaged and responsive. The plan for Village Center at Arapahoe Station was a good example of this newfound motivation.
Participants felt a critical improvement at this phase would be presenting a preliminary design for each station to the community, with extensive community involvement where TOD was
being incorporated or considered. The contractor could consider a hold period to allow relevant parties to review, but could proceed with design of the platforms, alignment, etc. Another
suggestion was to have the parking facilities constructed as late as possible in the project to allow for maximum flexibility on relationship and access to adjacent development, but this needs to be balanced against all other goals such as contractor cost and efficiency.
Participants also felt that decision-making power was unclear at this phase. Agreements between
the developer and contractor were not always acceptable to RTD or local jurisdictions. To
improve upon this, it will be important to minimize pitting stakeholders against each other.
Some ways to address this need are to provide clear and frequent communication amongst
stakeholders, establish and communicate the decision making authority and roles in the TOD
process, and involve the public when appropriate. Participants also suggested this phase of the
project suffered from the absence of a full-time TOD expert on RTD’s project staff.

Construction Phase
There was generally good dialogue between the project team, SECC and landowners, and other stakeholders reported good coordination between the project team and SECC during the


8






construction phase. The aggressive schedule also facilitated the timely resolution of challenges and prevented unresolved problems from dragging on.

But participants identified a need for more openness in the change order process. They
suggested that details of change orders should be worked out in a setting where assumptions
were understood by all involved. This would allow a common understanding of how costs were developed and make it easier to reconcile discrepancies in change order costs.

Participants also suggested that local jurisdictions and RTD need to consider how land-use
review procedures will impact the project, perhaps using a special streamlined process for
affected property owners as necessary. T-REX staff felt they were susceptible to being caught in the middle of negotiations between the developer and local jurisdictions. They recommended using checklists for property owners for regulations, easements, etc.

Information Sharing
The co-location of the project owners and the design-build contractor was considered a major plus for purposes of sharing information. Participants said the meeting summaries for the technical meetings were of excellent quality and very useful. They also complimented the amount and quality of public presentations.

Participants cited good coordination between land-use planning at station areas by the City and County of Denver and preparation of the EIS. They also praised the project team for its
willingness to be open to discussions and partnering on TOD.

The key opportunity identified for improving information sharing relates to planning.
Participants said RTD should interface more with the jurisdiction staff to better integrate TOD
into local planning efforts. While the local jurisdictions must take responsibility for the planning and land-use powers, RTD must be willing to partner and advise local jurisdictions about the interface with the project process.
Stations located at jurisdictional borders, such as Dayton, were identified as a special problem.
These situations require an increased level of coordination and communication. Participants
recommended that inter-governmental agreements be signed between the agencies with respect
to TOD planning at these station areas. Participants also said it was important to ensure RTD has adequate staffing for working with jurisdictions on station-area planning and design and
supporting legal documents.

Entity Roles
Participants said that the T-REX experience provided an excellent foundation for the FasTracks program, especially regarding the relationship between RTD and the contractor. They
emphasized that it was critical for all stakeholders to develop a team mentality to address
challenges and opportunities.

The need for designated TOD representatives for each entity with authority/budget was identified
as an important improvement that should be made to the process. There should also be some



9






type of TOD workshop/training early in the process for the developers, jurisdictions, owner, designer, and contractor.

It was suggested that RTD could facilitate the TOD planning process by bringing players
together and that RTD hire strategic development expertise familiar with development process
and financing to supplement its own staff. Participants reiterated their desire that the RFP be
specific in defining roles for the contractor and project owner in TOD implementation. This
should spell out early on what everyone’s expectations and roles are in the TOD process.

The local jurisdictions should have zoning/planning tools in place, take a stronger planning role, and be more supportive of a higher intensity of development at station areas. Jurisdictional staff should take the time to educate local elected officials and need to be able to sell reduction of
parking requirements in adjacent neighborhoods. RTD should also look for opportunities to
coordinate with local jurisdictions during ROW acquisition to identify properties with the
potential for joint development consistent with federal regulations for property acquisition.
Participants also suggested the importance of creating local jurisdiction incentives for TOD, such as density bonuses, parking reductions, and subsidized land.


CONCLUSIONS
The T-REX project by many standards has been a tremendously successful project. The fact that
the project was able to be completed ahead of schedule and within budget with relatively
minimal disruption to the neighborhoods within the corridor is truly an amazing story. From the
TOD standpoint, T-REX has had some success, but there are also some important lessons to be
learned that can be applied to other future FasTracks corridors to build and improve upon the
TOD process.

The following is a list of important lessons learned from the T-REX TOD process:

• Early action on TOD during the EIS - starting a discussion about TOD during the EIS
process is critical to ensure that TOD can be well integrated with the transit project
development process. Local jurisdictions should initiate station area planning during the
EIS and adopt those plans prior to the completion of the EIS process. As part of this
process, transit supportive zoning should be developed by local jurisdictions if does not
exist and pursued as part of implementing the results of adopted station area plans.
RTD, developers/property owners and the neighborhood residents are key participants in
the station area planning process. This process provides the best opportunity for TOD
plans to be integrated into project design if they are evaluated/discussed early before the
preliminary design for the transit project is completed. At a minimum, it provides
essential input into the formal EIS process. Although it should be noted that it isn’t the
only factor evaluated in making decisions about station location and design. Special
efforts should be made by local jurisdictions to reach out to property owners and
developers along the transit corridor to engage them in the station area planning
discussion.



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• Establish expectations about the TOD process early, with buy-in from critical
stakeholders - roles in the TOD process must be defined early during the station area
planning and EIS processes to establish responsibilities for moving forward with TOD
plans. Clear definition of the responsibilities of the local jurisdiction, developer, RTD
should be spelled out to minimize potential future conflict. As the project moves
forward into final design and construction, a clear process should be laid out for how
design changes associated with TOD will be addressed. This process should be
documented in the RFP for design consultants and/or contractors so that they can
incorporate the process into their formalized bid proposal. The process for addressing
changes resulting from TOD during design and construction should be developed with
input from developers, contractors, and designers to ensure consent on the process. For
local jurisdictions, it is important to establish a streamlined TOD review process to help
expedite the process. At a minimum, checklists should be developed by local
jurisdictions which set expectations as to what issues must be addressed when during the
development approval process. Another option taking things a step further would be to
establish a TOD design budget for the design-build contractor to deal with design
changes associated with TOD.

• Promote flexibility for TOD by maximizing environmental clearance and delaying
final design for stations with TOD potential - stations with clear potential for TOD
should have footprints cleared in the EIS that accommodate flexibility in design and/or
allow for design options that give flexibility to consider alternative station designs. Both
of these options give more flexibility to stations with TOD potential to make changes
following the completion of the EIS and therefore have a reduced risk needing to re-open
the EIS process. In addition to promoting flexibility, stations with clear potential for
TOD should only be designed to a minimum level while other project elements are
accelerated during final design. More specifically, parking facilities, bus facilities, and
drop off locations should be designed to a preliminary level while other facilities such as
rail track, structures and platforms are accelerated during the design process. This may
be accomplished by working with the designer and/or contractor early to put a hold on
preliminary design for certain stations. If possible, this should be identified prior to the
selection of a final design consultant and/or design-build contractor and addressed
specifically in the RFP for the consultant/contractor. As a part of the design process a
clear schedule should be established that defines “drop dead” dates for changes
associated with TOD so that impacts to the overall project schedule are minimized.
Another option to consider is for RTD to solicit development interest though a joint
development RFP for stations with a high potential for TOD separate from the design-
build contract. In this situation, RTD would make the land purchased for transit
purposes available for private development with the caveat that the private developer
would be required to accommodate RTD’s parking and bus facility needs. A key to this
approach would be to clearly establish progress milestones with a drop dead construction
start date to prevent the potential for RTD facilities to not be ready in time for the
opening of revenue operations for the transit line.

• Set up mechanisms to promote close coordination amongst stakeholders - coordination
and communication amongst stakeholders in the TOD process is critical. There are


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several mechanisms to promote this including having RTD staff co-locate with designers
and contractors. This promotes a team mentality and facilitates close communication
between RTD and the designer and contractor. Adequate staffing specifically for TOD
should be provided by the transit agency in the design and construction phases of the
project. The transit agency should provide full-time staff at these critical project phases
to ensure efficient and comprehensive coordination with local jurisdictions, developers,
designers, contractors and other stakeholders (this could be done through the use of
consultants or dedicated RTD staff). In situations where stations border multiple
jurisdictions, intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) or other legal mechanisms should be
developed between jurisdictions early during the EIS phase to establish a communication
process for the transit station design and TOD process. These types of stations require
increased levels of coordination and communication and IGAs can establish clear
expectations for a decision making process to minimize conflicts during the design and
construction process. Finally, RTD should facilitate corridor-level communications on
TOD to promote information sharing amongst local jurisdictions. This will allow
jurisdictions to share information and coordinate on specific, related issues and will
allow jurisdictions to learn from each others successes and failures. Also, during this
process a clear hierarchy of responsibility and financial implications associated with the
timing of TOD-related changes can be established (i.e., as projects progress into final
design and construction the financial implications and responsibilities of TOD-related
changes need to be clearly understood).



























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Appendix A
TOD T-REX Lessons Learned Workshop Participants


May 18, 2006 Workshop Participants
Mark Brown, Arapahoe County and City of Centennial Bill Skinner, Arapahoe County
Loretta Daniel, City of Aurora
Catherine Cox-Blair, City and County of Denver
Marilee Utter, Citiventure Associates
Steve Hebert, City of Greenwood Village
Dena Belzer, Center for Transit Oriented Development Shelley Poticha, Center of Transit Oriented Development Steve Koster, Douglas County
Bill Spragins, FMI
Brooke Maloy, Front Range Land
Dave Beckhouse, FTA
Jerry Jaramillo, Kiewit Construction
Bob Mattucci, Kiewit Construction
Joe Wingerter, Kiewit Construction/SECC
Eric Anderson, Parsons Brinckerhoff
Susan Altes, T-REX/RTD
Andy Mutz, T-REX/RTD
Rick Clark, T-REX
Steve Wilensky, T-REX/Carter & Burgess
Bill Sirois, RTD


Additional Participants Interviewed
Frank Cannon, Continuum Partners
Scott McFadden, Trammell Crow Residential
Buz Koelbel, Koelbel and Company
Jeff Sheets, Koelbel and Company
George Thorn, Mile High Development













13

The Mythical Benefits of Transit Oriented Development

http://www.cascadepolicy.org/pdf/env/I_125.pdf+why+transit+oriented+development+fails&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&gl=us

Page 1
The Mythical World of
Transit-Oriented
Development Steele Park in Washington
County, Oregon
by Michael L.Barton, Ph.D.
C
ASCADE
P
OLICY
I
NSTITUTE
September 2003
Page 2
About the Author
Michael L. Barton, Ph.D., is an academic advisor with Cascade Policy Institute.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Mark Ferris, Jamie Voytko and Kurt T. Weber for review-
ing the manuscript, and John A. Charles for research assistance and editorial comments.
Any errors remain the responsibility of the author.
About Cascade Policy Institute
Founded in 1991, Cascade Policy Institute is Oregon’s premier policy research center.
Cascade’s mission is to explore and promote public policy alternatives that foster indi-
vidual liberty, personal responsibility and economic opportunity. To that end the Insti-
tute publishes policy studies,provides public speakers,organizes community forums and
sponsors educational programs. Focusing on state and local issues, Cascade offers prac-
tical, innovative solutions for policy makers, the media and concerned citizens.
Cascade Policy Institute is a tax-exempt educational organization as defined under IRS
code 501(c)(3). Cascade neither solicits nor accepts government funding, and is sup-
ported by individual, foundation, and corporate contributions. Nothing appearing in
this document is to be construed as necessarily representing the views of Cascade or its
donors, or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before any legislative
body. The views expressed herein are the author’s own.
Copyright © 2003 by Cascade Policy Institute. All rights reserved.
ii
Page 3
iii
Contents
About the Author................................................................................................ii
Acknowledgments ..............................................................................................ii
About Cascade Policy Institute ..........................................................................ii
Introduction........................................................................................................ 1
Steele Park: TriMet’s First Single Family TOD.................................................. 1
Cars, Parking and Light Rail .............................................................................. 2
Density and Fire Safety Concerns ..................................................................... 4
Public Subsidies and the Wall ............................................................................ 5
The Planners’ Dream of Density Dissipates...................................................... 6
Steele Park and its Neighbors ............................................................................ 6
Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 7
Notes.................................................................................................................... 8
Page 4
iv
Page 5
1
Introduction
During the past decade, Portland-area plan-
ners haveembraced Transit-Oriented Devel-
opment (TOD) as the region’sdominant land
use/transportation strategy. They assert that
TOD, especially based on light rail, will re-
duce traffic congestion, increase transit use,
and make neighborhoods more livable.
Transit-oriented development is generally
defined as compact,mixed-use development
that concentrates retail, housing and jobs in
neighborhoods well-served by public tran-
sit. TOD has become so important to local
planners that it is now the primary justifica-
tionfor expansion of Portland’s light rail sys-
tem. Rail advocates concede that light rail is
not worth the cost if it is built only as a tran-
sit system.
Dozens of TODs have been constructed in
the Portland region since 1990, with several
winning national acclaim.Most havereceived
public subsidies, on the assumption that the
public benefits of TOD outweigh the costs.
However, little is known about how transit-
oriented projects actually perform in terms
of transit use and any correlated reduction
in auto dependency. The purpose of this pa-
per—the second in a series of CascadePolicy
Institute TOD case studies—is to help fill in
that gap.
1
Steele Park:TriMet’s First
Single Family TOD
Most Transit-Oriented Developments feature
mid-rise or high-rise apartments, lofts or
condominiums, built at 30 units per acre or
more. Portland-area government planners
envisioned Steele Park to be the showcase
project demonstrating that Transit-Oriented
Development (TOD) could also work with
detached,single family homes.The first phase
was built in 1996, two years before the
Westside light rail line opened. Developers
Steve Prince and Carl Spitznagle originally
planned a 44-lot subdivision on a 9.1-acre
parcel, located in unincorporated Washing-
ton County just north of the intersection of
Baseline Road and 170
th
SW Avenue. At its
nearest point the sitelies 1,300 feetfrom what
is now Elmonica Station of the light rail line.
Because of its proximity to light rail, county
planners approached Prince and Spitznagle
with an offer to help transform the planned
development into one deemed more transit
friendly.
County planners wanted much higher den-
sity for the project and offered several incen-
tives for the developers to change their
concept. Calthorpe Associates—a nationally
prominent design firm specializing in
TOD—was brought in to develop a revised
site plan, draft a “context”plan to assess how
this higher-density development might fit in
with its neighbors, analyze the salability of
the homes in existing markets, and develop
design guidelines for the proposed housing
types and street sections.
2
The county paid
$15,000 for these services.
The county offered to obtain a federal Con-
gestion Mitigation and Air Quality – Transit
Oriented Developments (CMAQ-TOD)
grant for $300,000 to build a wall buffering
the development from adjacent streets (see
Figures 1 and 5). Help was also offered with
the permits for wetlands mitigation.
The result was a new plan for 74 individual
homes and 18 units in a multi-family develop-
ment on an adjacent lot of 0.6 acre. The 74
homes were built, but the 0.6-acre lot remains
a field of grass and weeds (see Figure 1).
Steele Park homes are on small lots and built
close to the sidewalk.They all havesmall front
Portland-area
government plan-
ners envisioned
Steele Park to be
the showcase
project demon-
strating that
Transit-Oriented
Development
(TOD) could also
work with de-
tached, single
family homes.
Page 6
2
porches,a standard facet of the so-called New
Urbanism philosophy that attempts to pro-
mote “community” by moving the private
realm of the individual home closer to the
public streetscape.
The planning process took between one
and a half and two years versus the usual
six months for a standard suburban sub-
division. In ordinary circumstances this
delay could have been fatal, but because it
came during a period of rapid increases in
property values, the cost of delay was com-
pensated for by the increased profits on the
sale of the units. Prince described the pro-
cess of getting approval as “slow, but the
people at the county were amenable, very
good people.”
3
Cars, Parking and Light Rail
Steele Park was planned to discourage car
ownership and use.The roads are narrow and
parking is scarce. Public parking is only al-
lowed on one side of each street in the devel-
opment.The plan tried toencourage one-car
families, an idea Prince said was “very unre-
alistic.”
For personal investment reasons on the part
of the two developers, half of the two- and
three-bedroom units wereoriginally sold for
ownership and the other half marketed as
rentals.HomeownersI spoke with and Karen
Smith, the agent for the units initially desig-
nated as rentals, agreed that at least half of
the units originally sold are now occupied by
renters. Steele Park is thus mainly a rental
development and this makes meeting other
goals, e.g. limiting car use, more difficult,
because renters tend to bring in additional
roommates to split rent payments and each
tenant usually has a car.
The rental agreements limit cars to two for
the two-bedroom and three for the three-
bedroom units. This limit is much higher
than the original goal of one-car per unit and
Smith admits this limit is not met nor en-
forced. The rental units are often occupied
by more than one family, which further ex-
acerbates the parking problem. In fact
homeowners and Smith agree that a kind of
war is being waged in Steele Park between
the renters and homeowners. The issues in
dispute, such as parking and home mainte-
nance, are probably common to develop-
ments shared by those with differing
incentives to maintain the properties, but
everyone agrees that the problems are aggra-
vated by the limited parking and close prox-
imity of neighbors.
In much of the literature regarding Transit-
OrientedDevelopment thereis an explicit or
implicit expectation that people will change
their behavior to conform to the worldview
of planners. The notion, simply put, is that
by providing access to transit,forcing reduc-
tions in living space and restricting parking,
planners will “get people out of their cars.”
Leaving aside the question of whether it
should be the business of government plan-
ners to work against the free choices of resi-
Figure 1 - Washington County planners haven’t
gotten the density they planned for in Steele Park
because the highest density section, the 18-unit
multi-family development on a 0.6-acre lot (above
right), was never built. That lot has been sold and is
no longer part of Steele Park, which is seen in the
background.
In much of the lit-
erature regarding
Transit-Oriented
Development
there is an explicit
or implicit expec-
tation that people
will change their
behavior to con-
form to the
worldview of
planners.
Page 7
3
dents,it is clear that the effort has proven in-
effective in Steele Park. Because of the
crowded conditions,people respond bypark-
ing in their neighbors’ spots, in no-parking
areas and on the streets of adjacent commu-
nities where developers were allowed to pro-
vide adequate road space.
Portland advocates of TOD go to great
lengths to deny or understate this reality.For
instance,in its flyer Density in Your Backyard,
the planning advocacy group 1000 Friends
of Oregon argues that:
Transit-oriented developments
throughout the region also supply a
mix of transit service, higher density
housing, and neighborhood services.
Such development offsets increases in
automobile trips per household be-
cause people can walk, bicycle or ride
the bus to a park or grocery store.
4
Figure 2 shows a view ofSteele Park takenfrom
this flyer.Itshows fivetidyhomes lined up close
together on small lots, and a total of one car.
This projects the desiredimage of Transit-Ori-
ented Development: people will not need cars
when transit options are provided. A nearly
identical photo appears in TriMet’s profile of
Steele Park in the agency’s 1999 edition of The
Community Building Sourcebook.
5
The reality of TODs is shown in Figures 3
and 4, both were taken on an average after-
noon. The residents of Steele Park are typi-
cal suburban renters and homeowners who
need and enjoy their automobiles. Because
they lack adequate parking they leave their
cars in any open spot, legal or not.
I did a traffic survey on Wednesday morn-
ing, April 17,2002 for two hours starting at
6:25 a.m. The weather was partly overcast
with no rain and a temperature in the mid-
40s.I was positioned toobserveall trips leav-
ing Steele Park from the main exit on 170
th
SW Avenue just north of Baseline Road and
from the main pedestrian exit at the corner
of 170
th
and Baseline. Of the 73 trips out of
the 74-unit subdivision 11 went to the Max
light rail station. There were seven pedestri-
ans of whom four went to Max,one bicyclist
going elsewhere, and two of 14 multi-occu-
pant cars and five of 51 single-occupant cars
went to Max. Table 1 below summarizes the
results.
A total of 92 people left Steele Park in these
73 trips and four of them walked totake light
Figure 2 - The Promise: Steele Park homes as shown
in the 1000 Friends of Oregon brochure, Density in
Your Backyard. (Photo courtesy of 1000 Friends of
Oregon, www.friends.org).
Figure 3 - The Reality: A goal of government planners
was for Steele Park residents to be one-car families.
The above photo, taken on a typical afternoon—with
cars parked in driveways and in the street—shows
that there is often a big difference between what
people want and the ideas government planners
want to impose on them.
The residents of
Steele Park are
typical suburban
renters and
homeowners who
need and enjoy
their automobiles.
Because they lack
adequate parking
they leave their
cars in any open
spot, legal or not.
Page 8
4
rail. These data may understate the number
of people not going to Max because there is a
backway out of the subdivision,which heads
east, away from the Elmonica Station.
Density and Fire Safety
Concerns
Nationallyrecognized fire codes call for 20 feet
of“clear road access”within 50 yards ofa build-
ing. The roads in Steele Park are 24 feet wide
with parking allowed on one side.Thus,when
cars are parked in the street, there is less than
20 feet ofclear roadaccess.JeffGrunewald,Fire
Marshall for Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue,
agreed to the narrow streets with parking lim-
its but sayspolice rarelyenforce the parking lim-
its.
6
Grunewald subsequently worked on a
project for reducing streetwidths leading to is-
suance ofthe NeighborhoodStreetDesign Guide-
lines by the Oregon Department of Land Use
and Conservation.This guide calls for the pro-
vision of “adequate parking” so that on-street
parking is not the typical primary source of
parking.The objective is to havespace between
parked cars so that thereare queuing opportu-
nities.
7
Also,parking near intersections onnar-
row streets should not be permitted because it
can interfere with the turning movements of
large vehicles.
8
Fire Marshall Grunewald readily agreed that
Steele Park does not meet even these relaxed
requirements (see Figure 4).
Surprisingly,the State Fire Marshall does not
have the last word when it comes to review-
ing proposed subdivision plans for fire safety.
The question of authority was clarified in
1997 whenORS 92.044 was amended tostate
that standards for the width of streets estab-
lished by local governments shall “supersede
and prevail over any specifications and stan-
dards for roads and streets set forth in a uni-
form fire code adopted by the State Fire
Marshal, a municipal fire department or a
county firefighting agency.”
9
This change came about as a result of liabil-
ity concerns by the State Fire Marshall and
the OregonFire Chiefs Association (OFCA).
The OCFA wrote in a June 26, 1997 letter to
Metro, the Portland-area regional govern-
ment,“Planners are promoting and approv-
ing development that we may not be able to
service.”
10
The letter noted that legal opin-
ions at the time differed on where liability
would fall in the event emergency vehicles
were denied access in a development where
nationally recognized standards for fire de-
partment access had been ignored, and pro-
posed ceding authority to local planning
departments. According to Grunewald the
OFCA endorsed this proposal because local
Figure 4 - Another typical late-afternoon street scene
in Steele Park. Contrary to government planners’
desires, residents continue to drive cars. Here,
because of planned narrow streets, parking is
restricted to one side of the road—so cars often
impinge on the corners where there is supposed to
be a no-parking zone for fire access.
Max Other
4 3
0 1
2 12
5 46
11 62
Pedestrian
Bicycle
Multi-occupant Car
Single-occupant Car
Total
Table 1 - Trips out of Steele Park, mode and
destination
Surprisingly, the
State Fire Marshall
does not havethe
last wordwhen it
comes to reviewing
proposed subdivi-
sion plans for fire
safety.
Page 9
5
planners were overriding their recommen-
dations anyway.
Public Subsidies and the Wall
TriMet’s1999 Community Building Sourcebook
described Steele Park’sfinancing this way:“The
project is privately financed with the exception
of a $300,000 CMAQ-TOD grant....”
11
Itturns
out, however, public subsidies for the project
totaled some $463,000,plus the $15,000 cost of
the Calthorpe contract,and none ofthe money
came directly from a federal Congestion Man-
agement and Air Quality grant.
The original purpose of the $300,000 grant
was to fund the construction of a wall around
the project as an inducement to the develop-
ers to go with the high-density design pro-
ducing 74 homes rather than their original
plan for 44 larger homes on larger lots. Un-
fortunately the plan called for the wall to be
built on the developer’s land rather than on
public land, and that made it ineligible for
the CMAQ-TOD grant, which had already
been approved. Forging ahead, Washington
County arranged to use unrestricted county
funds for the wall and entered into two In-
tergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) to ex-
ecute the deal.
One IGA with the Portland Development
Commission promised Washington County
“a$300,000 federal Congestion Management
and Air Quality (CMAQ) grant for bike and
pedestrian facilities on 185
th
from Blantonto
Kinnaman … in exchange for the County’s
pedestrian-oriented improvements at 170
th
and Baseline.”
12
This exchange did not ulti-
mately work out and the CMAQ grant money
eventually was used for bike and pedestrian
improvements to Cedar Hills Boulevard.
13
The County paid the $12,000 administration
fee for this grant, an additional cost of the
money exchange.
A separate IGA with TriMet provided up to
$200,000 from the County’s Traffic Impact
Fee fund for TriMet to use in Tualatin in ex-
change for a like amount of TriMet general
funds, which could be legally used to build a
wall on private property.
This sort of money laundering—swapping
restricted-use funds between government
agencies—seems to be commonplace in
today’s planning bureaucracy.
14
In several
phone conversations, TriMet and Portland
Development Commission staff members
promised to provide their reasons for enter-
ing into these IGAs but failed to do so.
Aside from the arcane financing scheme, it’s
not clear what the purpose of the wall was
and what it had to do with Transit-Oriented
Development.Because government planners
obtained the CMAQ grant to help pay for it,
they presumably thought it would help re-
duce congestion or air pollution (otherwise
it would not have qualified for CMAQ fund-
ing).But Mark Ferris,a planner who worked
with the developers to design Steele Park,
wrote, “the wall was strictly decorative.”
15
MarkBrown,a principal planner with Wash-
ington County, told an Oregonian reporter,
“it’s [sic] primary purpose was to be an ar-
chitectural feature for the neighborhood.”
16
However,many of the earlyresidents of Steele
Park apparently thought the wall had been
built as a sound barrier, and complained it
wasn’t working. In 1997 The Oregonian re-
ported that occupants of 32 of the
subdivision’s then-completed 49 homes sub-
mitted a petition to the County, asking it “to
beef up the wall for several reasons, includ-
ing child safety, crime prevention, sound re-
duction, increased personal privacy and its
effect on future resale prices.”
17
According to
the article, Steve Prince acknowledged that
he might have told some residents a sound
This sort of
money launder-
ing—swapping
restricted-use
funds between
government agen-
cies—seems to be
commonplace in
today’s planning
bureaucracy.
Page 10
6
barrier would be built. Prince told me the
article was “not accurate” but he did not
specify in what regard. The wall is shown in
Figures 1 and 5.
Washington County declined to make any
improvements to the wall and today it re-
mains ornamental. A homeowner I spoke
with, who lives just across the wall from
Baseline Road, describes it as “useless” for
noise reduction.
The Planners’ Dream of Density
Dissipates
Washington County planners haven’t gotten
the density they had planned for in Steele
Park because the highest density section of
the development, the 18-unit multi-family
development on a 0.6-acre lot, was never
built. In fact it isn’t even part of the Steele
Park development anymore.
Steve Prince sold the lot to Emerald Develop-
ment Company of Beaverton, which attached
the lot to its yet-unbuilt Meridian Village project
just west of Steele Park (see Figure 6).
Emerald Development got the zoning
changed for the 0.6-acre lot and plans a
mixed-use facility with three commercial
outlets and 12 condominiums.
18
Emerald
Development Co.managerHabib Matin said
he was pleased to have negotiated 50 park-
ing spaces after “a back and forth battle with
the City.” This victory may be short-lived,
however, because the approval for Emerald’s
plan has expired and it has to start the regu-
latory process anew.
Steele Park and its Neighbors
A walk through Steele Park reveals a crowded
but pleasant neighborhood with lots of cars
and lots of kids.Because the houses are small
most residents seem to use their garages for
storage and I saw no car actually parked in a
garage.Parking is restrictedto one side of the
road and parked cars often impinge on the
corners where there is a no-parking zone for
fire access. Residents share a concern over
safety and agree that the narrowing of street
widths at the corners fails to control speeds;
coupled with the presence of parked cars on
the corners, owners and renters alike worry
over the safety of their children with drivers
taking the sharp corners at high speed.
The developments adjacent toSteele Park fea-
turelarger homes on larger lots and the own-
ers and occupants seem unhappy with their
more crowded neighbors. One man had
moved two blocks out of Steele Park because
Figure 5 - Part of the Steele Park decorative wall that
many residents thought would be a sound barrier.
Figure 6 - Site of unbuilt Meridian Village.
The developments
adjacent to Steele
Park feature larger
homes on larger
lots and the owners
and occupants
seem unhappy
with their more
crowded neigh-
bors.
Page 11
7
of its “undesirable character.”Another home-
owner, whose house is right next to Steele
Park,complains of residents parking in front
of his home and refers to the development as
a “ghetto.” Because one of the goals of the
planning process is the creation of livable
communities this animosity raises the issue
of how high-density, limited-parking devel-
opments can coexist with more traditional
neighborhoods.
Conclusion
Steele Park is a pleasant little neighborhood.
New residents are planting shrubs and making
home improvements,and neighbors seemcon-
cerned about eachother.The problems the resi-
dents havewith parking would just be their own
problems (except for the fire safety concerns)
and their unhappiness with the decorativewall
would be their own unhappiness except for the
fact that several local governments stepped in
and created this neighborhood with these prob-
lems because of a philosophy of Transit-Ori-
ented Development.
In comparing the stated objectives of TOD
with the reality of Steele Park, it’s apparent
that the objectives are not being met. Most
residents don’t use light rail regularly, and
those who do tend to drive the quarter mile
to TriMet’s free Park-n-Ride lot. Local roads
receive more traffic from the Steele Park de-
velopment than they would have under the
original, medium-density design, and con-
sequently it’s impossible to argue that TOD
has resulted in improved air quality. The at-
tempt to use $300,000 in federal Congestion
Mitigation and Air Quality funds for the
decorative wall led to high transaction costs
due to the complexity of the Intergovern-
mental Agreements required to swap funds,
and the wall itself ultimately proved useless
for noise reduction or any other environmen-
tal benefit.
TOD advocates claim that light rail is a cata-
lyst for real estate development, but the ex-
perience at Steele Park suggests that
developers havetobe inducedand/or coerced
to build at higher densities through the use
of public subsidies and land-use regulation.
Even then, land near light rail frequently lies
vacant because it is not economically feasible
to build the kinds of projects desired by gov-
ernment planners.
Bill Avery, principle planner with the Wash-
ington County Department of Land Use &
Transportation, called Steele Park a “long-
range fiasco,” citing the look of the project,
the high ratio of renters to owners, the dis-
like of the adjacent neighborhoods and “op-
position from the Fire Marshall.”
19
Perhaps the most notable assessment ofSteele
Park has come, in a subdued fashion, from
TriMet. In 1999 TriMet published the Com-
munity Building Sourcebookas a one-stop in-
formation source about transit, land-use
planning and TOD. Chapter Three included
profiles of more than 20 Transit-Oriented
Developments,one of which was Steele Park.
TriMet described Steele Park as the first Port-
land-area TOD to feature detached, single-
family homes.
In December 2002 TriMet published a new
edition of the Community Building
Sourcebook. Although Transit-Oriented De-
velopment is still heavily promoted,the Steele
Park profile has been deleted.
20
TOD advocates
claim that light
rail is a catalyst
for real estate
development, but
the experience at
Steele Park sug-
gests that
developers have to
be induced and/or
coerced to build at
higher densities
through the use of
public subsidies
and land-use
regulation.
Page 12
8
Notes
1
The first Cascade TOD case study was John
A.Charles,MPA,and Michael Barton,Ph.D.,
The Mythical World of Transit Oriented De-
velopment: Light Rail and the Orenco Neigh-
borhood, Hillsboro, Oregon (Portland, OR:
Cascade Policy Institute, April 2003),
www.cascadepolicy.org/pdf/env/I_124.pdf.
2
Professional Services Agreement between
Calthorpe Associates and Washington
County, March 28, 1994, Attachment “A”.
3
Steven Prince, personal communication
with author, May 2002.
4
1000 Friends of Oregon, “Density in Your
Backyard,” www.friends.org.
5
Community Building Sourcebook (Portland,
OR: TriMet, 1999), pp. 3-7.
6
Brent Hunsberger,“NarrowStreets Increase
Fire Officials’Worries,”The Oregonian, Sept.
7, 1998, p. B2.
7
“Queuing”refers to using the gaps between
parked cars to accommodate two-way traf-
fic along a narrow street.
8
Neighborhood Street Design Guidelines (Sa-
lem,OR: Oregon Dept.of Land Use and Con-
servation, Nov. 2000), p. 11.
9
Ibid., p. 5.
10
Letter from Oregon Fire Chiefs Associa-
tion to Metro (regional government, OR),
June 26, 1997.
11
Community Building Sourcebook, p.3-7.
12
Washington County [Oregon] Board of
Commissioners Agenda, Aug. 6, 1996.
13
Joe Younkins,Washington County Capital
Project Management, personal communica-
tion to author.
14
See, e.g., Charles and Barton, pp. 21-22.
15
MarkFerris,personal communication with
John A. Charles, Cascade Policy Institute
(Portland, OR), July 9, 2003.
16
Alex Pulaski, “Residents Dissatisfied with
County’s Buffer,” The Oregonian, March 3,
1997, p. B4.
17
Ibid.
18
Habib Matin, Manager of Emerald Devel-
opment Co., personal communication with
author, October 2002.
19
BillAvery,interviewwithMichaelL.Barton,
Ph.D., April 18, 2002.
20
Community Building Sourcebook(Portland,
OR: TriMet, Dec. 2002).
Page 13
9
Page 14
10
Page 15
11
Page 16
C
ASCADE
I
NSTITUTE
P
OLICY
813 SW Alder, Suite 450
Portland, Oregon 97205
(503) 242-0900
info@cascadepolicy.org
www.cascadepolicy.org
fax (503) 242-3822

Measuring the Success of Transit-Oriented Development

Measuring the Success of Transit-Oriented Development

Retail Market Dynamics and Other Key Determinants



Prepared for the
American Planning Association
National Planning Conference
Seattle, Washington, April 24-28, 1999
Session S-180: Will Retailing Collide with TOD?

by

John Niles
Global Telematics
4005 20th Avenue West, Suite 111
Seattle, Washington 98199
Phone: 206-781-4475
Fax: 208-730-2420
Email: jniles@alum.mit.edu


Dick Nelson
Integrated Transport Research, Inc.
122 Northwest 50th Street
Seattle, Washington 98107
Phone & Fax: 206-781-0915
Email: dicknels@msn.com

Abstract

Transit-oriented development (TOD) has become the dominant urban growth planning paradigm in the United States. Yet scant evidence has been proffered to indicate that it will produce significant environmental and social benefits commensurate with the costs of the major transportation system improvements that it requires.

Sixteen distinct planning issues will determine whether TOD significantly changes travel behavior in a metropolitan region. While some analysis exists, understanding of these issues needs improvement. In particular, more research is needed on non-work travel, retail market dynamics, and the likely constraints this $2.3 trillion area of business and human behavior imposes on TOD.

Introduction

Over the past two decades numerous metropolitan areas in the United States have embraced the concept of transit-oriented development (TOD) in an attempt to control and manage the negative environmental and social impacts of dispersed growth patterns (Porter 1997). TOD, it is suggested, will increase pedestrian and transit trip taking while reducing the number and length of auto trips, and it will contribute to the livability that some feel is lacking in modern suburban development (Calthorpe 1993).

In essence, TOD means the creation of denser, mixed use activity nodes connected by high quality public transportation. Proponents believe that a combination of design features will induce travel mode shifts that result in reduced area-wide traffic congestion and improved air quality. These features include improved street connectivity, public amenities, and a concentration of residences and jobs in proximity to transit stations and commercial businesses. As an additional benefit, the enhanced pedestrian environment will increase "casual encounters" among neighbors that can contribute to a sense of community.

These efforts typically begin implementation with major new "mass" transit investments, often light-rail systems, that are designed to link central city cores, suburban downtowns, and other major activity centers. TOD is possible without new transit, but most metro areas choose to make the transit investment. Bernick and Cervero (1996) suggest that what is needed for TOD to succeed is a "transit metropolis," meaning a sufficient number of TODs having balanced or special uses that are connected and allow for efficient rail travel with bi-directional travel flows.

Construction of the new transit system usually precedes the land use restructuring required to effectively support the investment, i.e., the concentrations of population, employment, public amenities, and commercial activities that will attract transit riders in sufficient numbers to satisfy the transit system’s fare box recovery requirements. Commercial activities, in particular, often become a consideration after the transit system alignment is finalized and station areas are identified.

A useful review of previous studies in the urban planning and transportation literature of the transportation impacts of neo-traditional development and TOD is provided by Berman (1996). This paper summarizes several more recent empirical and modeling studies of TOD, and it indicates how TOD success should be measured. Specifically, it outlines the key factors that need to be understood and weighed before significant new transit investments are made. Our aim is to enhance the regional planning process in a way that leads to cost-effective investments of scarce public dollars.

Local Benefits vs. Regional Benefits

It is important to distinguish between regional and local benefits produced by TOD, and the magnitude of benefits at both scales of measurement. Intuition suggests that station-area development involving mixed use and higher employment and residential densities will induce more pedestrian and transit trips. Several studies lend credence to this belief. However, since the ideal TOD is still a planner’s vision, researchers have resorted to comparing older neighborhoods that approximate TOD with conventional suburban neighborhoods that do not. These studies suggest that the increase in non-auto trips, although small, is measurable (Bernick and Cervero 1996).

Yet local area benefits may not translate to regional benefits, especially when weighed against the costs of the transit investments needed to link individual TOD centers. Consequently, the central question for planners and decision makers is the magnitude of TOD’s regional impact, namely reduced congestion and improved air quality that are the principle concerns of the traveling public. Nelson and Niles (1999), after reviewing the empirical studies to date, suggest that they provide insufficient evidence that TOD on a regional scale, even when supported by large transit investments, is likely to produce significant regional benefits.

It is important, therefore, to understand the factors that determine the regional and local success of TOD. This paper reviews the key factors and suggests where further work is needed that will expand our understanding of the strength of each and hence of TOD’s potential. We focus particularly on the obstacles posed to TOD by the dynamic nature of the commercial marketplace, an important area of inquiry that has been largely overlooked in previous studies. Our purpose is not to be exhaustive, but to provide a overview which might stimulate more in-depth work.

Key Factors Determining TOD Success

A number of variables will determine the success of TOD at both the station-area and corridor or regional scale (Table 1). As indicated previously, we define success as the extent of the mode shift -- from autos to pedestrian and transit modes -- that is attributable to TOD. In economic terms, success is the benefits of this shift net the costs of building and operating new transit facilities. As thusly defined, success is measurable, and may be predictable. Other measures of success, such as sense of community and livability, although appropriate and important, do not easily lend themselves to either empirical measurement nor estimation through the use of models (Project for Public Spaces 1997).

Some factors play a major role in determining local, station-area success, while others have a significant impact at both the local and the larger, corridor/regional scale. In other words, success may be achieved at one or several TODs if a few positive factors are present, but success will probably not be achieved at a regional scale unless a greater number of factors contribute in a positive fashion. We are not suggesting either the relative magnitude nor the sign of the impact of these factors, only that each may be significant in determining the success of TOD.

Together, these factors in Table 1 represent independent (exogenous) variables in equations that might be written to predict either the probability of success or its magnitude at both scales of interest. Several studies have attempted to dissaggregate the effect of some of these variables, while others have measured their combined effects. In the following, we cite the most recent research into these factors, and we suggest gaps in our understanding that need to be addressed.

TABLE 1. Factors determining the success of TOD
Factor Station-area success Regional success
Number of TODs (& station areas) X
Transit quality X
Transit technology X
Street pattern X X
Station-area parking X X
Employment and housing density X X
Commercial mix X X
Retail siting criteria X
Regional market structure X
Consumer activity patterns X
Travel behavior/trip chaining X
Zoning flexibility X
Resident reactions X X
Housing type preference/life style & life stage X
Self-selection in residential choice X X
Government policies X

Number of Stations/Extent of Transit Investment

Supporters of TOD envision a network of dense, mixed-use activity centers linked by high quality transit. Centers can serve a neighborhood or a larger area. The latter, or urban TOD, includes the suburban downtowns of major metro areas and major employment centers. Activities in each of these centers or nodes are origins and destinations for regional travel.

TOD land use and public transportation structure will change travel patterns and modes to the extent it offers improved access to desired activities for a significant portion of the population currently experiencing acceptable auto accessibility. Centers must be within an easy walking distance (1/4 mile) to residents, and one or more other centers must be easily accessible by transit. As the distance between a center and the traveler’s origin increases, transit accessibility will tend to decrease more rapidly than auto accessibility. More transfers and hence more wait time will be a reality of the transit trip.

The proportion of the regional population that lives within close proximity to activity centers and their transit stations will obviously depend on the number of stations. And, of course, the number of centers and stations will depend on the public’s willingness to build and operate the transit system. For any metro region, then, the number of people shifting to transit will be determined by the quality of the public transit system as well as the number of their daily activities that are located in TODs.

Calculating the accessibility (and mode shifts) for levels of transit quality deemed affordable to a given region is obviously a complex exercise that requires an accurate regional model. However, it is possible to estimate the scale of the transit investment that is needed to capture a sizable fraction of auto users.

Downs (1994) did this by calculating the number of TODs needed to accommodate the average population and employment growth during the 1980’s of metropolitan areas with a 1990 population of one million or more. He concluded that TODs could handle the growth if their numbers were large, but that this would require a regional transit system that a city might not find financially feasible.

This leads to the inference that considerable numbers of travelers who live outside of TODs need to be attracted to transit, both for work and non-work trips. Again, this will entail investments in new transit, possibly in the form of neighborhood circulators, e.g., small vans, buses, or personal rapid transit vehicles that deliver passengers to TOD station areas and, with well-coordinated intermodal transfers, to a regional network of TODs.

A number of metro regions have modeled the transportation performance of various TOD scenarios based on assumptions concerning the portion of new growth that will be accommodated by existing and new activity centers. There is not space here to review these estimates, but it should be noted that the numbers generated, usually travel delay and air quality, will be highly dependent on the accuracy of the model and whether its design takes into account the interplay of the variables listed in Table 1. We address the status of current models and the need for decision making tools below.

Transit Technology

It is often asserted that TOD benefits from rail or other fixed-guideway transit. Commercial developers, it is believed, are attracted by its permanence. In pre-auto cities, dense development around subway and surface rail stations that dates back to the turn of the century is common. Yet it is not as easy to draw the conclusion that rail transit is both more permanent and a greater attractor of development than is bus transit.

A number of historical studies have reviewed the evolution of transit in several cities. However, none appears to have explored the question of the relative permanence of rail versus bus. A cursory and unpublished study of bus routes in Chicago found that most had remained unchanged since they were established in the early 1900’s.1 Many post-auto cities have experienced the development of electric trolley systems starting in the 1890’s and their removal and replacement with bus in the 1930’s and 1940’s. And now some of those trolley lines are coming back in the form of light rail.

Porter (1997), in a study of TOD across the United States, concludes that rail tends to stimulate concentrated development in areas such as central business districts where transit is highly accessible and auto traffic is impacted by congestion and costly parking. Another study found that rail alone is not sufficient to generate development; strong market forces and supportive public policies are also needed (PBQD 1996).

Street Patterns

TOD design would have street patterns oriented along a grid, as opposed to the cul-de-sac and curvilinear street designs of many post Word War II US suburbs. Within the grid are sidewalks and streetscapes that encourage walking, and narrow streets and other traffic calming features that discourage driving. Crane (1996a, 1996b, 1998), Crane and Crepeau (1998), and Boarnet and Sarmiento (1996) have reviewed previous studies that suggested positive impacts of these design elements. Their more recent evaluations question the assertion that more traditional street design will reduce auto travel.

Crane (1998), based on a review of empirical studies that compare travel patterns for neighborhoods with traditional designs and modern suburbs, suggests that TOD can just as easily increase auto travel, both trip rates and vehicle miles traveled. He observes that auto travel may increase because of improved street connectivity and accessibility to neighborhood centers. Crane finds that most studies have ignored income and demographic variables that explain differences in travel behavior.

Station-Area Parking

TODs are designed to be pedestrian and transit friendly. The potential for reducing auto travel is enhanced if parking demand and supply at centers can be moderated. Some studies indicate that this may be difficult, given the current and expected continued auto dependency. Steiner (1998) found that San Francisco area shopping centers generate auto trips from outside the immediate vicinity and consequently may require more parking capacity than prescribed for by New Urbanism standards. Similarly, Thompson (1999), who modeled TOD performance in the Sacramento region, suggests that work centers must provide sufficient parking to meet the demands of the large majority of residents and employees in TODs who will continue to use autos for their travel.

Station-Area Housing and Employment Density

Studies in different metro areas have shown (Moudon et al 1997; Cervero & Kockelman 1997) that denser residential development within an easy walk of a TOD center and transit station will generate walk trips, and that these trips may substitute for vehicle trips. However, in the case of work trips, regional success is dependent on density at both trip origin and destination. At least a few concentrated employment centers served by transit are needed to attract significant numbers of commuters. The problem is that employment locations have become highly dispersed outside of the central business districts in most metro areas.

These trends appear to be continuing as central cities decline in relative, and some cases absolute, share of regional employment. For example, in 1970 39% of all jobs in the Seattle metro area (central Puget Sound region) were located in the central city. By 1994, just 29% of regional employment was inside the central city, even though it has remained a vibrant commercial center. Another 17% was situated in 16 satellite urban centers. More than half of all jobs were located in areas outside urban centers -- in commercial and industrial zones spread across four counties.

Cervero (1996), acknowledging the problem of density at both ends of the commute trip, cites the example of commuting in the San Francisco Bay area. Using 1990 Census data, he estimates that 9 % of residents in the three BART-served counties lived within a half mile of a BART station, and just 18 % of these station-area residents commuted to work by rail transit. Thus only about 2% of commute trips within these counties were taken by station-area residents using BART. Thompson (1999) suggests that transit use will grow and contribute to the success of TOD only if public policy can channel dispersing job growth to suburban transit corridors.

Station-Area Commercial Mix

Handy (1996) studied the importance of commercial establishments to the inducement of walking trips in several traditional and modern Austin neighborhoods. Although she found the total savings in auto travel by households to be small, it was statistically significant and increased with the number and variety of local stores.

A key question arises with respect to the commercial mix around stations when rail transit is retrofitted into existing urban form. There is evidence that the commercial market may not value the financial rewards of station-area location as much as planners value the regional environmental and social benefits. Porter (1997) found that development around station areas, even in the case of the first of the new rail systems, such as those in Washington, DC and San Francisco, has not occurred as rapidly as expected. He summarizes the conclusions of researchers that station-area development is more a product of market interest in specific locations than a response to transit.

Store Siting, Regional Market Structure, and Consumer Behavior

The commercial market’s apparent reluctance to choose station areas reflects the criteria for preferred store sites that are determined by the needs of developers and owners to succeed financially. Nelson and Niles (1999) suggest that an understanding of key retail site selection criteria and the market forces currently shaping a metropolitan region’s retail structure may help planners identify ways to improve the commercial mix at stations so that they attract more pedestrian and transit traffic.

These criteria are summarized in Table 2. Some stores, both those that offer goods and services, tend to cluster to achieve market advantage. Clustering, which is most observable in planned shopping centers, also facilitates more efficient auto access. Stores of all kinds are getting larger, both in floor and market area, taking advantage of economies of scale. Sites that offer good visibility and regional as well as local access tend to be preferred. Often, this is in a stand alone location rather than in a commercial cluster. Developers tend to avoid locations that create environmental impacts that might be objectionable to local residents.

TABLE 2. Key retail location decision criteria

Agglomeration economies

Scale economies

Visibility, access and parking

Environmental impacts

Zoning and public resistance

Retail location has shaped and is in turn shaped by consumer behavior (Table 3). Consumers express strong preferences to buy cheaply, to compare competing products, and to experience variety. And they are willing to travel often and farther than their neighborhood commercial center to find each.

TABLE 3. Consumer behavior characteristics

Bargain hunting

Comparison shopping

Preference for variety

Destination flexibility

Schedule flexibility

The modern marketplace provides consumers considerable flexibility that was not previously present. The variety and choice offered by the marketplace allows consumers to undertake a particular activity at several different locations. And by extending hours and days they are open, retail stores accommodate diverse personal schedules.

These location criteria and consumer characteristics combine and interplay in ways that have produced the pronounced retail structural trends summarized in Table 4, trends that are seen in metro regions across the United States.

TABLE 4. Major trends in retail market structure

Retail activity increasingly polycentric and dispersed

Planned shopping centers dominate market

Smaller malls cluster around major malls

"Big Boxes" market share growing

"Super" stores growing in kind and number

Many chains prefer stand alone sites

Dining out continues strong

Drive to and through convenience growing

Source: Nelson & Niles 1999

Figure 1 shows how one of these trends, the growth of planned shopping centers, has developed in the Seattle metro area. Planned shopping centers of three or more stores now number over 450 and contain about 80 million square feet of leasable area. They are spatially dispersed and are located where there is good auto access.

The modern retail structure has in turn produced profound changes in personal and household travel patterns that must be understood in order to improve TOD’s chances of success.

Travel Behavior/Trip Chaining

Our focus is on "retail" activities because they directly or indirectly account for a large majority of all personal travel. By retail, we mean shopping for goods and services, eating out, and engaging in recreation, social and cultural activities outside the home. These nonwork activities generated almost three out of five person trips in 1995 (Table 5).

TABLE 5. Trip Purposes (Percent of All Person Trips)
Work 20%
Shopping 20%
Family/Personal Business 24%
Recreational/Eating Out 17%
Other 22%

Source: NPTS 1995

Nonwork trips are often chained with work trips and with other nonwork trips to maximize travel efficiency. The data in Table 6 show the importance of trip chains for the Work to Home and Home to Home tours, and the differences between genders. These data suggest that if TOD is to accomplish mode shifting, activities to be located in a TOD should be identified by pinpointing the specific purposes and locations of stops in these tours. Other tours of interest are, of course, the Work to Work and the Home to Work tours.

TABLE 6. Chaining of non-work trips (Percent of weekday tours with two or more Stops)


Work to Home


Home to Home

Men


17.7 %


38.6 %

Women


28.2 %


43.7 %

Source: McGuckin and Murakami 1999

Zoning and Resident Reaction

Redevelopment and infill often have to contend with zoning and environmental issues. Zoning, once established, is not easily changed, especially if the intent is to increase density, convert commercial strips to more compact nodes, and create a greater mix of uses. The authors could not find a comprehensive study of the national experience regarding proposals to change local zoning, but they are familiar with attempts to revise zoning in the context of Puget Sound area growth planning. Residents of neighborhoods where government has proposed TOD development tend to resist increased density and its impacts, whether real or perceived. Even commercial development that brings new stores and services is not always welcomed. People tend to oppose change, especially if they believe there will be impacts such as increased vehicle traffic. Attitudes toward zoning changes may differ in metro regions that have been working on this issue for some time. For example, a transportation plan for suburban Portland recommends zoning be used to guide all new retail space to TOD sites (1000 Friends of Oregon 1992).

Housing Type Preference: Life Style & Life Stage

Proponents of TOD believe that more Americans will choose "traditional" housing types -- small houses, condos, walkup apartments, accessory units -- especially when they are conveniently located near amenities. This assumption cannot yet be verified, even though the market has begun to deliver more housing of a traditional character, and buyers and renters have responded well to many of the new developments (Steuteville 1998). The number of developments, especially on urban and suburban infill sites, is still relatively small even when counted nationally.

Yet, for planning purposes, it would be instructive to know whether the current market response reflects new converts to TOD housing, or whether consumers are simply selecting housing that they would have otherwise chosen. And if there is a conversion process underway, how significant will it be in the longer term? Is it more than a small niche market? Will most home buyers and renters be attracted by the affordability of housing and on the metro fringe, as well as other attributes of suburban and exurban living?

Without the revealed preference of consumers, we are forced to fall back on what people say they prefer. National surveys commissioned by Fannie Mae (Fannie Mae 1996, 1997, 1998) provide some perspective on American’s housing preferences. In 1996 Fannie Mae asked adult American about their attitudes towards housing and home ownership. Of those contacted, 73 % said their ideal home is a single-family detached house with a yard on all sides. Since ownership of all types of homes, including townhouses and condos, is currently at about 64 %, if the trend follows stated preferences, it should be toward more single-family detached ownership, not less. The same survey found that Americans are willing to make significant tradeoffs for home ownership. Four of five would drive a longer distance to work if they could own rather than rent a home.

Fannie Mae’s 1997 survey asked people where they would like to live. A large majority indicated they preferred either a small town or a suburb near a large city. Only 9% favored a large city.

For the past 30 years the housing market has produced a growing proportion of single family units with steadily increasing floor area (see Figure 2). New multifamily units have also been increasing in size, growing 20% in average floor area from 1988 to 1997 (US Census Bureau). The low mortgage interest rates, relaxed borrowing requirements, and strong economy of the late 1990’s have pushed home ownership to record levels. Fannie Mae’s most recent survey, in 1998, indicates that a majority of renters have a strong desire to move up to ownership. It will be of interest to see if the detached single-family preference and size trends continue as ownership rates increase.

Another recent private sector survey (American LIVES 1995), for the real estate industry, found that four of five consumers who bought or shopped for a home in several states, were unwilling to give up the cul-de-sacs, large yards, and privacy that comes with single-family detached homes set back from the street. A large majority didn’t like the often homogenous look of conventional suburbia either. Their preference: a new suburban look with a town center as a community-gathering place, small shops, green space, and plenty of convenient parking.

The American Housing Survey sheds some light on the reasons people move and choose their neighborhood. Of the many reasons cited for leaving a previous home, the desire to establish one’s own household and the need for more space rank highest in the most recent nationwide survey (Census Bureau 1997). The attributes of the house itself and its convenience to job were given most often as the top reasons for choice of neighborhood, while convenience to public transportation was eighth on the list of reasons.

A wild card that may effect housing type and size is the impending retirement of the Baby Boom generation. The US population age 55 and over will increase from 21% of the population in 1995 to over 29% in 2020. These "empty nesters" may choose to downsize their housing and opt for more locational convenience. Fannie Mae explored the future housing preferences of Baby Boomers in its 1998 Survey. A majority, 53%, said they will remain in their current house, either as is or with renovations, while 35 % indicated that they would sell, and either buy or rent a new house. The survey did not probe whether the size of the new house had been considered in retirement plans.

Self-Selection in Residential Choice

A factor related to travel behavior and housing type preference is the propensity for self-selection in choice of residence location, i.e., people who are the most likely to use transit choose to live near transit stations. Self selection, to the extent it occurs, will mask the magnitude of transit’s true impact on travel behavior. Crane (1998) points out that empirical studies that compare the travel behavior of people who live in one kind of neighborhood with people who live in another ignore this data bias. To analyze the self-selection problem, Boarnet and Sarmiento (1998), using econometric analysis, modeled both the choice of where people live and how they choose to travel to nonwork activities. They could find no influence of land use on travel in their Southern California sample when controlling for self selection. Dueker (1999) points to the possible importance of self-selection in assessing the ridership numbers for a new light rail system in Portland, but suggests that more data are required to isolate the strength of this factor.

Government Policies

Several metro areas have actively worked on TOD implementation for more than a decade. In the process, some excellent resources have been developed. For example, workbooks have been produced and workshops convened to encourage TOD in the Puget Sound region (PSRC 1998; Puget Sound Regional Council 1996; Snohomish County 1993; Energy Outreach Center 1997). These efforts have identified available policy initiatives that could encourage TOD.

Local governments have several policy tools available to leverage denser and more diverse development within TODs. These include the provision of public amenities such as parks, recreational facilities, and government services. Private development can be induced through density bonuses, tax abatement, tax increment financing, and direct grants. Joint development schemes serve to stimulate developer interest. Porter (1997) has reviewed the policies and actions taken by local government and transit agencies in a number of metro areas. He concludes that light rail is likely to attract relatively small development projects outside of central business districts (Porter 1998).

Many actions involve expenditures of some kind, so they will be subject to the financial limitations of local government budgets. They will have to compete with other demands on the public purse. Also, to the extent they are offered to a few developers, there may be pressures to provide similar benefits to others who cannot, for whatever reason, operate within the confines of a TOD. The cost of these expenditures obviously must be weighed along with transportation costs in planning TODs.

Discussion: Importance of Retail Dynamics

The potential for TOD’s success will to a great degree depend on the response of the retail marketplace, including developers, store owners, and consumers, to the imperatives of density and transit accessibility. This follows from the significant fraction of all personal trips, including commute trips, that now involve nonwork activities.

Unless present long-standing trends are reversed, the marketplace will continue to evolve, producing ever greater variety and choice and, as a result, greater spatial dispersion of activity locations and more complex travel patterns. Consumer goods, services, and entertainment are converging to create new types of consumer venues where kids and parents can eat, shop, and play together or separately. At the same time, new market forces are rapidly entering the scene in ways that may gradually change the spatial relationships of consumer to stores. Online sales tripled in 1998 over 1997. But even in the $4-5 billion range, it is minuscule compared to $2.3 trillion in retail overall.

Market richness has allowed older retail strip neighborhood centers to adapt and flourish even as they have lost traditional stores to the economies of scale and clustering. New kinds of specialty goods and services have entered the market. For example, some older neighborhood centers have become regional or sub regional destinations for consumers seeking an ethnic dining experience or antique chair. These centers, that may have otherwise been candidates for redevelopment and consolidation to a TOD had they remained underutilized, have developed a new life without the requirement that they change their form.

The large number of market variables and these dynamic changes make it difficult to predict the response of developers, store owners, and consumers to the TOD paradigm, even assuming TOD’s need for major land use and transportation restructuring can be accomplished. Urban models, even new activity-based models, may not be able to predict consumer demand for new types of housing and the mix of activities that can be accommodated in TOD. The model may be capable of prediction, but the data needed to validate the model may not exist.

Planners thus face a dilemma. Local government policy makers will continue to feel public and federal government pressure for answers to the congestion and air quality problems. They will probably continue to embrace TOD and its concomitant requirements for major transit investments. But these polices will be established without clear proof that the investments will produce commensurate public benefits.

NOTES

1. Personal communication from Prof. Genevieve Giuliano, University of Southern California School of Urban and Regional Planning.

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