The phrase,'Unsound Transit', was coined by the Wall Street Journal to describe Seattle where,"Light Rail Madness eats billions that could otherwise be devoted to truly efficient transportation technologies." The Puget Sound's traffic congestion is a growing cancer on the region's prosperity. This website, captures news and expert opinion about ways to address the crisis. This is not a blog, but a knowledge base, which collects the best articles and presents them in a searchable format. My goal is to arm residents with knowledge so they can champion fact-based, rather than emotional, solutions.

Transportation

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Sound Transits Chronology of Broken Promises

> Preface: Sound Transit in 2007 makes ready for Phase 2
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> Sound Transit is promoting its Phase 2 program, called ST2, with the necessary taxes to be voted on November 2007. As with the case of Phase 1, the $3.9 billion Sound Move Ten Year Regional Transit System Plan adopted in 1996, ST2 is a wildly misrepresented proposition, with grossly understated costs and exaggerated benefits. It is a pork barrel operation so vast that it dwarfs any public works projects ever done in the Northwest--including the five nuclear power plants known as the WPPSS disaster (Washington Public Power Supply System).
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> Here is the cost if ST2 were to be approved: By the time Sound Move and ST2 30-year bonds are scheduled to be paid off in 2057, Sound Transit would tax local citizens $141 billion--$64 billion for its Phase 1 Sound Move Plan, and $77 billion for ST2. RTID over the same period would collect $16 billion. Schedule of tax collections year-by-year, 2008 through 2057 is available here in a one-page pdf.
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> WPPSS' fiasco topped out at a mere $26.5 billion.
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> As Sound Transit progresses, absorbing a larger and larger share of the region's total transportation dollars--from federal, state, and local governments, combined--it is making the overall regional transit system less and less productive. That is entirely clear from performance to date, and it is amply confirmed even if one accepts all of Sound Transit's cost and ridership data as reliable.
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> Here are some summary points that the citizens of the region ought to know:
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> 1. Transit has gone from absorbing 29% of the region's transportation money (federal, state, and local), in 1990, to 50% today, headed toward 63% in 2030.
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> The scale of spending on transit has grown from $290 million in 1990, to $1 billion today, headed for $4.5 billion in 2030, if Sound Transit's ST2 passes. And Sound Transit, though serving a very modest share of transit trips, will absorb a progressively larger share of transit money--evidence of its lack of productivity.
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> The chart was prepared by Jim MacIsaac, P.E., of Bellevue in September 2006. There's a corroborating graphic in the Stanton-Rice Regional Transportation Commission (RTC) Final Report, though it extends only to 2003, when the allocation was roughly 50-50. Click here to see that graphic on page 4-3 of the RTC Report.
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> 2. Transit has experienced a long-term decline in market share of daily trips, and the forecasts of a rebound in the future have been declining as well.
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> While the absolute and the relative scale of spending on transit has been ascending, transit market share has been declining. It may have stabilized at 2.5% recently, and it might have rebounded modestly last year, aided by $3 per gallon gasoline. But each successive Puget Sound Regional Council projection has been revised downward, as shown in the chart below from Dr. Bill Eager, President, TDA, Inc. The latest, July 2006, projected a span from 3.2% to 4.5% in 2040--even while transit will finance that tiny share of daily trips with 63% of the public's transportation money. And that's assuming the massive transit investments summarized work as well as represented--contrary to Sound Transit's record to date.
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> 3. "Ready to ride light rail trains past the growing congestion?" Sound Transit's high-price rail projects mean transit becomes less efficient, and the transportation system becomes relentlessly more congested.
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> The future of the United States, and the Puget Sound region, depend on the productivity of the economy--the more efficient provision of goods and services, by improving benefits provided relative to the cost of labor, materials, and equipment. Primarily on account of Sound Transit, the region's transit system rapidly is becoming more unproductive, with escalating costs relative to the number of daily riders and related regional benefit. This reverberates throughout the entire transportation system, as transit absorbs a progressively larger share of transportation resources, while delivering no commensurate benefits.
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> Even if one accepts the plausibility of Sound Transit's current projections--the capital development costs, construction schedule, and future ridership--a dubious assumption, given the agency's record, diminished transit and transportation productivity are the result. Relatively more and more resources will be poured into Sound Transit, but the number of riders does not grow proportionally, with counterproductive results.
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> Through 2030, Sound Transit has budgeted Revenue (including Bonds) at $50 billion. It predicts by that time it may serve 351,000 daily rides. Most will be transfers from less-costly bus transit to more-costly rail transit. Perhaps 40% of the patrons will be "new riders"--about 63,600 daily round trips by new transit customers. The average capital investment required for each new daily transit commuter will exceed $700,000!
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> In 2006, Sound Transit bragged that it served 1.7 million boardings with Sounder--even though that fell far short of its projections. (The agency makes a habit of arbitrarily ratcheting its projections down to a low, achievable level. Then it announces it beat its target. But its new target is not the one used to justify the investment.) Sounder's Operating Costs in 2006 were $30 million; each transit boarding cost $17.65, on average. The average fare is about $2.50 (less than the listed fare, on account of various discounts, including those for children and the aged)--so the per-boarding subsidy exceeds $15. Each round-trip commuter was taxpayer-subsidized $30 daily, approximately $7,500 for the year--just in operating costs. The annual subsidy for the capital investment is multiples that amount. And a good share of the patrons have been transferred from much less costly express buses to much more costly commuter rail service, compounding the inefficiency.
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> In 2002, Sound Transit's executive director acknowledged Sounder's high operating costs, but promised that "economies of scale" would solve that problem. Over the five years since her declaration, the level of per-boarding subsidy has not abated.
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> Because Central Link light rail is so many years behind its construction schedule, its performance cannot be demonstrated. But even accepting the rose-tinged Sound Transit projections, it also promises to deliver less transportation value for the investment. The little Tacoma Link streetcar (of a very different design than Link Light Rail in Seattle) is vastly more costly, per-passenger mile, than conventional bus transit.
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> The Puget Sound Regional Council has run the numbers not only for Sound Transit, but for all the planned regional transit and road improvements, out to 2040. Assuming that Sound Transit collects and spends its Phase 1 (approved) and Phase 2 (pending approval) budgeted total of $78 billion revenues through 2040, and then spends even more to double the extent of the programmed light rail for a 125 mile network, here is the result: Overall congestion on freeways and arterials will be two to three times worse than it is today, as measured by the time delay per vehicle mile traveled caused by slowing below the legal speed limit.
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> To repeat, a doubling of regional traffic congestion even with 125 miles of light rail is the planners' best case forecast, requiring new public policies to put more housing units and job sites closer to each other and to train stations. A tripling of congestion is forecast to be experienced if present land use goals are reached.
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> There is a perverse truth in Sound Transit's headline declaration that, in the future, the relative few who will have convenient access to a line may be "ready to ride light rail trains past the growing congestion." But it is the misallocation of scarce public resources, and the wasteful squandering of those resources on Sound Transit rail schemes, that are root causes of worsening congestion.
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> 4. The per-passenger-mile and per-trip costs of Sounder commuter rail and Link light rail are multiples of the costs for bus transit.
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> The evolution of Sound Transit is accompanied by a progressive deterioration in the productivity of the transit system. Sound Transit rail is a very costly, backwards step. Applying the Federal Transit Administration's guidelines, and Sound Transit's data for costs and trips, over the current quarter-century Sounder commuter rail will cost about four-times as much as Regional Express buses, both per-passenger-mile and per-trip. And Link light rail will cost between three and four times as much as the local bus transit agencies, both per-passenger-mile and per-trip.
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> These charts are calculated from Sound Transit and other transit agency data covering 2000-2025 in 2005 dollars (pdf).
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> 5. Transit is utterly dependent on roads and highways.
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> Not only does transit already absorb 50% of our public transportation dollars, it is utterly dependent on the roads, highways, and bridges. Today 99% of the region's transit trips are via bus, traveling on the roadways; only 1% is on rail. Virtually every Sounder commuter rail patron reaches his or her station via a private automobile, and parks free in its huge lots and garages. Upon disembarking en route to work, many then catch a bus.
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> Even the Puget Sound Regional forecast for a future in 2040 with 125 miles of light rail shows that the majority of transit trips will include a ride on a bus. Click here for the planned mode split in the 20 million daily trips forecast for 2040.
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> Sounder commuter rail promotes far-off suburban living, at huge taxpayer subsidies, hence its program of massive additional investments in parking garages in its ST2. The point is illustrated by Joni Earl, in the February/March 2007 edition of Mass Transit magazine:
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> "Because I ride the train, I talk to customers a lot. There was a guy I just started chatting with, and he said his wife and he wanted to live more in the country. They've always been in Seattle and wanted to raise their children in a more suburban-type setting. And he said the only way that made it possible was Sounder."
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> In 2006, each daily Sounder commuter was subsidized $7,500--just on the operating side, while the annualized capital cost subsidy is several times greater. Just so Joni Earl's Sounder companion can move his family out of Seattle, and live a long distance from work.
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> 6. Sound Transit's cost and ridership predictions have proven wildly inaccurate--and have deteriorated at a more rapid pace since Joni Earl became executive director in 2001.
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> Among the myths created by Sound Transit is that there were some mistakes and hidden costs until 2000, but since Joni Earl became executive director in 2001, things have gone well. In fact, during her tenure the gap between promise and performance has accelerated. This is most dramatically illustrated by Sound Transit's two rail programs, Central Link light rail and Sounder commuter rail, its most costly, most over-budget and behind schedule projects. Here is the data from the pre-Joni Earl to the post-Joni Earl era:
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> Sound Move 10 Year Plan, 1996 Joni Earl begins as CEO, 2001 Today, 11 years into the 10 year plan
> Cost of 82-mile Sounder commuter rail line, Everett to Lakewood: $650 million $944 million $1.25 billion*
> Completion date for all Sounder trains in operation for full 82 miles: 2002 2006, at the latest 2012 or 2013
> Cost of 21-mile Central Link light rail line: $2.3 billion $3.6 billion, with "no more surprises" $5 billion**
> Completion date for 21 miles of Central Link in operation: 2006 2012 Sometime after 2017***
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> *$1.25 billion is budgeted from Sound Move (Phase 1) tax resources. But Sound Transit also is rolling costly components of Sounder into its Phase 2 budget--including a notably expensive mile of track south of Tacoma, and stations at Edmonds and Tukwila. The cost to complete 82-mile Sounder, with the promised stations, will far exceed $1.25 billion.
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> **$5 billion is an understated amount. So-called "initial segment" is budgeted at $2.7 billion. The downtown to UW/Montlake segment, $1.5 billion. UW Stadium to University District will cost at least $500 million. SeaTac Airport to South 200th, $300 million. That totals $5 billion--and doesn't account for the value of the promised stations at First Hill, Convention Place, South Graham Street, Boeing Access Road, and South 144th. For example, Sound Transit "saved" $350 million by forfeiting its First Hill station.
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> ***2016/17 is the target date just to get from the Airport to UW/Montlake. There is no current schedule to complete Central Link from NE 45th to South 200th, as promised in the 1996 Sound Move Plan to be by 2006, and by Joni Earl in 2001 to be by 2012.
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> As for ridership, Sound Transit promised in 1996 that it would serve 52.2 million trips in 2010, and probably a lot more. As of 2005, it had lowered its projection by 58 percent, to 22.1 million trips. Most of the trips consist of former bus riders served by the local transit agencies.
> The share of operating costs covered by fare revenues is sorely deficient. The worst performance is Sound Transit rail: it was supposed to cover 40 percent of operating costs by fares during Phase 1, through 2006--but fares covered merely ten percent.
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> That's the quality of Sound Transit's performance on its "Ten Year Plan"--touted by the agency as a "test drive," to see how well it performed. The table at right is from a complete review of Sound Transit's performance against the 1996 Sound Move plan -- a 2005 document titled Sound Transit Report Card, (pdf).
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> Now Sound Transit wants to rush through more taxes for ST2 before the "initial segment" of its "starter rail" is complete, and before its "test drive" performance can be scrutinized.
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> 7. Misrepresented operating & maintenance (O&M) expenses add billions to the future costs of Sound Transit.
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> What follows is very large fraud committed on the people of this region.
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> The economic consulting firm, ECONorthwest, in evaluating the Sound Move Ten Year Regional Transit System Plan in 1996, noted the agency's impossible O&M numbers. They were projected into the distant future at a static level -- no annual increases save inflation (CPI), even while the system would be expanding service, equipment would be aging, and with strong transit labor unions. ECONorthwest pointed out that in the preceding years, the US transit industry averaged increased O&M costs at CPI + 4% per-passenger mile for bus transit, and CPI + 7.2% per-passenger mile for rail transit. At current CPI rates, that approximates 8-11% increases annually for Operating & Maintenance line items.
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> The ECONorthwest evaluation from 1996 is available in pdf, with the O&M comments on pp 10-11.
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> This 1996 objection has been manifested in the yawning discrepancies in Sound Transit's actual O&M costs, contrasted with its original low-ball predictions -- though the consequences are masked by the tardiness of Sound Transit's project implementation. For example, Sounder commuter rail in 2006 had been projected at $30 million for 15 daily round-trip trains. In fact, it was just about $30 million -- but that covered only 6 daily trains. The per-train O&M cost was 2.5-times that predicted, $5 million per train rather than the $2 million forecast by Sound Transit. And Central Link light rail, to be entirely completed an operating by now, will have but a fragmentary "initial segment" in 2009 or 2010, with at best one-third the promised ridership.
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> In 2006, Sound Transit's hand-picked Citizen Oversight Panel (COP) called attention to the discrepancies in O&M costs and projections, and in a January 11, 2006 letter (pdf) pleaded with the agency to take corrective action. It reviewed Sound Transit's performance, the experiences of other transit agencies, and strongly recommended that Sound Transit raise its projections from CPI + 1% (since 1996, the agency had made a small upward adjustment from CPI only) to 8-10%, approximately CPI + 4-6%, strikingly close to ECONorthwest's observation a decade earlier. COP urged Sound Transit to be realistic, and added that the agency's "O&M costs are unsustainable over time."
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> The following is a forward-looking anecdote illustrating the unreality of the agency's current O&M projections: If Sound Transit increased the O&M of Sounder by merely 5% annually, scarcely more than CPI+1%, it would approach $60 million by 2019. In fact, that's what is budgeted for 2019. But between 2006 and 2019, Sound Transit intends to expand service from six to 13 daily trains, with enormously escalating costs: more trains, more labor, more fuel, more track miles, more maintenance, more liability insurance, in parallel with the escalating scale of the operation. The $60 million likely won't be adequate to support six trains -- and yet it is supposed to support 13.
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> In the four years from 2002 to 2006, while Sound Transit moved from two to six Sounder trains, O&M increased annually by 26% to 33%. That's hard experience. In the 13 years following, 2006-2019, during which time Sound Transit plans to increase daily service from six to 13 trains, it has budgeted annual O&M increases averaging just over 5%.
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> In spite of its experience to date, the operating cost record in its industry, the prudent observations of ECONorthwest, and the pleadings of its own Citizen Oversight Panel, Sound Transit still projects O&M costs decades into the future at annual rates generally in 4.5 - 5.2% range, roughly CPI + 1%. This subterfuge virtually guarantees a fiscal disaster for the region. Even if those numbers are recalculated at the lowest rate proposed by the Citizen Oversight Panel, 8%, the "swing," as of 2057, is in scores of billions of dollars!
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> The following graphic shows the results of a sensitivity test prepared by veteran transportation expert Jim MacIsaac, a volunteer analyst for CETA and Eastside Transportation Association. His test shows the escalating chasm between the inadequate O&M costs assigned by Sound Transit, and the lowest adjustment urged by the Citizen Oversight Panel, 8 percent per year. This is very likely to be too optimistic. In year 2045, when Sound Move Phase 1 bonds are scheduled to be retired, a purported Sound Transit surplus of $12 billion will be reduced to a deficit of minus $2 billion.
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> The data behind the graphic above is contained in a table prepared by MacIsaac, "2007 Fin Plan Sum & O&M Compare" (pdf). If the data are projected to 2057, the deficit plummets to $20 billion, instead of a purported surplus of $28 billion--a downward swing in the General Fund of $48 billion. That's much too big to be managed, so Sound Transit's remedy--unless it can raid the taxpayers for another bail-out--will be to cut service savagely.
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> On August 24, 2007, more complete information on Sound Transit's fraudulent O&M projections was provided in a report to the State Auditor. That information is available for inspection here.
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> 8. The cost of the November 2007 Regional Transit Investment District (RTID) and Sound Transit Phase 2 "integrated roads and transit" plan is being misrepresented.
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> Expert Jim MacIsaac has summarized the cost of the proposals, from the respective agencies' official data. He applied standard accounting practices--like debt service payments during the capital development phase are part of the development costs of the project, as decreed by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. He used standard year-of-development dollars, not denominations back-dated to make them appear smaller.
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> Through the 20-year period, RTID will cost $14.3 billion (capital program $9.3 billion, and finance costs $5.0 billion). Click here for an estimate of the RTID Financial Plan as of May 28, and subject to change before the November election.
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> Sound Transit Phase 2 will cost $23.56 billion (capital program $17.5 billion, finance $2.0 billion, operations, maintenance, and administration $2.6 billion, and reserves $1.4 billion). Click here for ST2 combined phase one and phase two taxing and spending plans through 2027 and 2057 in pdf based on official documents approved by the Sound Transit Board.
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> Although Sound Transit is actively trying to fob-off ST2's cost as $10.9 billion in back-dated 2006 dollars, the agency admitted back in November 2006 in an official but obscure report, that "From 2008-2027 the total capital program and operating costs are...$17.1 billion in YOE [year of expenditure] dollars. These figures do not include debt service, bond reserves, or administrative costs."
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> Combined ST2 and RTID, total is $38 billion during the development phase, 2008-2027.
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> In the ensuing years long-term interest will be paid, $4.2 billion by RTID, $21.5 billion by Sound Transit in phases one and two combined.
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> Total capital cost, including long-term interest: $63 billion.
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> Sound Transit, and now, following its bad example, RTID, are grossly misrepresenting the costs of their proposals--which markedly exceed the cost of anything ever undertaken in the Northwest. Sound Transit's is vastly more costly--because it's much more money annually, and it's a "forever tax"--it's perpetual. Whereas RTID proposes a set of discrete projects, including long-term interest, after which the necessary taxes will sunset.
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> Sound Transit projects it will collect $141 billion in local taxes through 2057: $64 billion for Sound Move Ten Year Regional Transit System Plan, and $77 billion for its Phase 2 projects--in which numerous items have been rolled-over from Sound Move. We forecast that most of this large sum in the long run will go to operations and maintenance costs. RTID (roads package) taxes are forecast at $16 billion. A year-by-year schedule of regional tax collections is available here (pdf).
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> 9. The per household cost of the ST2 and RTID taxes are more than double what people are being told by these agencies.
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> For example, in 2008, Sound Transit projects it will collect $358 million in local taxes, from a population of 2,763,500. That's $128 per-capita. But it reduces that figure to only $125 per household--$50 per individual. (A local household averages 2.47 persons.) In 2057, Sound Transit expects to collect $3.3 billion in local Phase 2 taxes, from a population of 4,288,000, hence a per-capita cost of $964. Over the years 2008-2057, the per-capita Phase 2 cost would total $21,840--that's what the average person will pay.
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> Click here for a pdf showing estimated tax revenues per household as calculated by Jim MacIsaac.
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> Meanwhile, Sound Transit's Sound Move Plan (Phase 1) taxes will remain in force. During that same 2008-2057 era they will total $19,100 per-capita (rising from $130 in 2008 to $772 in 2057). Combined: $40,940 for Sound Transit, from an average Central Puget Sound taxpayer, 2008-2057.
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> If the average household remains at 2.47 persons, it would pay approximately 2.47-times the $40,940 per-capita cost. The
> cumulative, per-household taxes of Sound Transit through 2057, when its Phase 2 round of 30-year bonds will be paid off, will approximate $100,000!
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> RTID provides comparable under-statements of the impacts of the taxes it will collect. Save that, after 2027 its taxes will diminish until bonds are paid off, while Sound Transit's Phase 2 taxes will continue to escalate, in perpetuity, just like its so-called Sound Move Ten Year Plan taxes. In any case, unlike the deceptive numbers proffered by Sound Transit and RTID alike, the simple, straightforward way to calculate the cost of these projects to citizens is to take the scale of taxes to be collected, for each agency, and divide it by the number of persons in the taxing district.
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Six more chapters follow, prepared by John Niles, Technical Co-Chair, Coalition for Effective Transportation Alternatives

10. Light Rail Initial Segment from Westlake Center to Tukwila may be getting into budget, schedule, and safety trouble.

2001 established Link Initial Segment project budget of $2.4 billion remains valid -- asserts Sound Transit.

"Note of caution should be exercised with regard to the current budget status until such time as the impacts from the Beacon Hill Station redesign are clarified along with potential claims issues on the contracts for the Maintenance Facility and the Rainier Valley." -- Federal Transit Administration's oversight consultant. [Project Management Oversight Consultant report of December 2006, page 13.]

Planned passenger service start forecast by Sound Transit of July 3, 2009 will be met -- asserts Sound Transit.

"Less-than-planned construction progress is an increasing risk to achieving the planned revenue service date." -- FTA's oversight consultant. [ibid, p 1].

The graphic progress summary at right published by FTA shows the line of triangles marking progress slow converging with the right hand "late" line. Click to enlarge.

ALSO: "Lack of progress in producing a compliant Safety and Security Management Plan for the construction phase of the Initial Segment project, as well as concern over organizational changes ... appear to have seriously weakened safety oversight on the project....The senior remaining Safety Manager was transferred to Operations and no longer has responsibility for safety oversight of the Initial Segment Project...."
-- FTA oversight consultant comment in late December 2006 prior to the accidental death of Beacon Hill Tunnel construction worker Michael Bruce Merryman on February 7, 2007. [ibid, pp 4-5]

The quotes above are from Federal oversight reports obtained from Sound Transit via the citizen request process defined by the Public Disclosure Act. Sound Transit releases construction progress reports on its website.

11. Construction of Seattle's 6-mile, $3 billion light rail tunnel contributes to global warming, not compensated later by reduced driving.

The Seattle 6-mile subway tunnel is a project that spans both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of Sound Transit's mass transit construction. This is the planned $3 billion, twin-track North Link light rail tunnel from downtown Seattle to 75th Street just south of Northgate. See the dotted line on the map at right. "Tunnel muck" - the dirt from tunnel construction - will be removed from behind the Tunnel Boring Machines via access holes to the tunnel construction at future Link train station sites -- Capitol Hill, Husky Stadium, and Roosevelt.

People in the future taking trips on electric light rail instead of gasoline-powered cars or trucks yield a reduction in CO2 greenhouse gas emissions. The Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for North Link provides energy data that converts to greenhouse gas emissions. North Link Light Rail in operation would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by about 14 thousand tons annually from operations that save on solo-driver vehicle travel, assuming present-day automotive technology. This is the long-term atmospheric impact, an improvement in emissions that begins when the North Link trains start running about 2016.

The immediate atmospheric impact is the 640 thousand tons of greenhouse gas generated by the seven year construction of North Link beginning as early as 2008. The SEIS for North Link reports that construction consumes an amount of energy that is equivalent to a line of tanker trucks from Union Station to the Canadian border, each carrying 8000 gallons of diesel. This energy consumption yields CO2 greenhouse gas emissions that are now considered an important cause of global warming.

Federal Transit Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation assumes that a full 50% of the energy to construct North Link comes from City Light and BPA dams, and can be considered "carbon free," thus not contributing to climate change. The other 50% of energy is assumed to be fossil fuels for construction vehicles like dump trucks hauling tunnel muck and yields a total CO2 emission of 640 thousand metric tons. Muck to be removed is substantial, approximately equivalent to covering a football field to twice the height of the Space Needle. Dirt removal trucks will follow the path shown on the map below to reach I-5 from the 3 acre Capitol Hill construction site (click map to enlarge):



Thus, 640 thousand metric tons of greenhouse gas are emitted in the light rail subway tunnel construction period --- against just 14 thousand metric tons saved in each later year of operation. This computes to 45 years to get the CO2 emissions balanced out by the CO2 savings later.

Sound Transit and FTA claim this four-decade CO2 payback period is acceptable for a railroad infrastructure that will last 100 years.

However, this contention is debatable. Lower emission levels from future automobiles likely mean there will never be CO2 reductions through train patronage that compensate for the emissions of tunnel construction.

Officials of transportation sustainability advocacy groups Sierra Club, Sightline, and Transportation Choices Coalition have been asked by PITF or its friends to respond to the issue of life-cycle greenhouse gas production and reduction for the Seattle light rail subway, but have remained silent through the end of May 2007, despite professing an interest in transportation improvements that reduce carbon dioxide emissions.

Sound Transit has offered a tepid response in the description of its Phase 2 planning (ST2) that covers construction of the Seattle subway tunnel: "Furthermore, the Sound Transit Board is committed to exploring ways to reduce to the maximum extent practicable the greenhouse gas emissions during construction and operation of the ST2 Plan."

12. Six hundred mile Bus Rapid Transit network for mass transit provides more coverage, capacity, and ridership than Sound Transit's 125 mile light rail network, while costing billions less.

The maps at left, prepared by Jim MacIsaac, P.E., illustrate the comparison between a Bus Rapid Transit system based on enhancing existing Region Express and other transit agencies routes, and the Phase 1 and Phase 2 light rail program of Sound Transit.

Mass transit organized around a rail spine is frequently said to offer these advantages over an all bus system:

1. Higher passenger carrying capacity.
2. Faster travel times.
3. Greater operational economy because fewer drivers needed.
4. Greater energy efficiency.
5. Less diesel pollution.
6. Best way to shape urban development, because it has more permanency.
7. Easier for customers to use.
8. Attracts more riders.
9. Gains more tax-paying support from citizens who don't ride transit.
10. Presents a positive "world class" urban image
11. Federal government provides the capital to construct rail spines

These countervailing factors need also to be considered in deciding between light rail and all-bus solutions:

1. Buses can be more closely spaced than trains, and can pass other buses along the route, and thus offer equal or greater capacity than trains.
2. Exclusive and semi-exclusive transit lanes, plus priority at traffic signals can make buses move faster.
3. The maintenance and operating requirements of tracks, stations, and rail vehicles reduce the advantages of savings from fewer drivers per passenger seat mile.
4. The cost of railroad construction establishes a high energy debt before the trains even begin operating; furthermore, energy efficiency depends on ridership as well as vehicle characteristics.
5. Modern electric and electric hybrid buses are becoming less polluting year by year.
6. There are numerous examples worldwide of bus transit shaping urban development. Downtown Seattle is a local example.
7. There are many techniques, processes, and technologies that make riding buses easier for customers than is typically the case.
8. Rider attraction depends more on trip attributes than on the mode, including safety, door-to-door trip time, ride quality, crowding on vehicles and stations, need to transfer.
9. Today, polls show that a majority of citizens prefer trains to buses. However, this is a matter of understanding the costs and benefits.
10. Today, trains arguably do present more of a positive "world class" urban image for mass transit than buses do. This is a matter of education and understanding.
11. Federal Government support for rail mass transit is waning, and there is more interest in supporting lower-cost bus-based transit.
12. Bus rapid transit systems can be built incrementally, with the first improvements installed years sooner than the time to build railroad tracks.

13. Light rail on the Center Roadway of the I-90 Floating Bridge reduces people-moving capacity and truck freight capacity.

Light rail on the I-90 floating bridge across Lake Washington is part of Sound Transits' Phase 2 plan to be voted on November 6, 2007. Although there are historical agreements calling for train tracks to be installed, new consideration of rail versus bus capacity points to a need for reconsideration. The light rail plan calls for only 12 trains per hour, one every 5 minutes.

First prepared by Jim MacIsaac, P.E., of Eastside Transportation Association, the following chart illustrates why deploying better bus service on the I-90 bridge offers more cross-Lake people-moving capacity than converting the Center Roadway to light rail tracks. Closely-spaced buses on the bridge can easily accommodate as many passengers as light rail trains, considering just seated capacity. In between the buses, other HOVs -- carpools and vanpools -- add to the hourly capacity. In contrast, between the trains on a right-of-way dedicated to light rail would be only empty space on valuable infrastructure.

In addition, the Washington State Department of Transportation's I-90 Center Roadway Study provides data showing that truck flows would be lower in 2030 with trains on the floating bridge ("2030 Exclusive" in the chart below) than with retention of the Center Roadway for buses and other HOVs ("2030 Non-Exclusive" in the chart below). The following chart illustrating the computer-modeled truck flow in 2030 on the East Channel Bridge in the morning peak hour reduced by 16% when light rail is built in the corridor is one example out of many that can be derived from data in that report.

14. Rice-Stanton transportation governance reform study trumped by November 6, 2007 vote for $47 billion Proposition 1

Regional Transportation Commission (RTC) headed by former Seattle Mayor Norm Rice and cellphone entrepreneur John Stanton over a six-month study process in the second half of 2006 found that the present Puget Sound regional transportation governance system is inadequate, and called for a substantial reorganization of regional transportation planning.

A version of the Rice-Stanton recommendations (report cover at left) were approved for implementation by the Washington Senate in a March 12, 2007 bi-partisan majority vote 33-14. Click on the report cover for a page of extracts and commentaries that links to the complete report.

Sound Transit Chairman John Ladenburg characterized this approval as a "no confidence" vote on the "roads and transit" package to be voted on November 6.

Existing planning agencies that comprise the inadequate system have put together the $47 billion package as the next big step implementing a Metropolitan Transportation Plan that lets performance worsen.

A PSRC environmental impact analysis of the implementation results of the November proposal and its follow-on reveals that the 2040 performance is a doubling to tripling of regional traffic delay and anemic growth in transit market share, even with 125 miles of light rail and Sounder operating in rush hour from Lakewood to Everett.

These officially forecast and published results in a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (report cover at right) describe a path of worsening regional transportation performance under the present governance system. In addition, the 2040 forecast shows that even with stronger growth management putting 80% of new population growth in the 32 largest cities of the region, the average household will have 30-minute transit accessibility to fewer than 2% of regional job sites. Click on the report cover at right for more details extracted from this report, as well as a link to the complete report.

As cogently described by former U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta in May 2006, "Congestion is not a scientific mystery, nor is it an uncontrollable force. Congestion results from poor policy choices and a failure to separate solutions that are effective from those that are not."

If Proposition 1 fails in the vote of November 2007, the State Legislature could reasonably choose to order the implementation of Puget Sound transportation governance reform to occur first before a new tax election aimed at providing today's broken transportation governance system with billions of dollars more to keep on doing what it is already doing so badly.

15. The case for making Sound Transit complete the 1996 Sound Move Phase 1 plan before voting to double taxes for Phase 2.

Sound Move was originally approved as a ten-year, $5 billion program. Sound Transit is now reporting that Sound Move is a twenty-four year, $15 billion program.

Central Link Light Rail from the University District to S 200th was the 1996 Sound Move mainstay commitment for Phase 1. Sound Transit has now reduced the phase 1 Central Link commitment to a shorter segment downtown Seattle to the Airport, scheduled to be completed by the end of 2009. Building the tracks all the way to Northgate was authorized in Sound Move, but not funded.

In summary:

The 1996 Sound Move commitment was to build Central Link light rail in ten years, and then hold a vote to continue the 1996 tax level to build more light rail, or rollback taxes to a level sufficient to pay off bonds and operate what was already built.

Instead, we are voting after 11 years to double Sound Transit taxes with just a 15.6 mile portion of the committed, once-said-to-be-funded 22 miles of Central Link "starter line" light rail still two years away from a scheduled opening. Originally promised light rail stations at First Hill, Convention Place, Graham Street, Boeing Access Road, and South 144th are off the table and no longer in the Sound Transit plans.

Map on the right is what Sound Transit committed to in 1996 for Sound Move Phase 1. Click on the map to enlarge. Note that the Central Link light rail line goes from U District to South 200th in SeaTac, with an authorized but not funded segment from U District to Northgate. Sound Transit has made the light rail lines north of Husky Stadium and south of the Airport to be in Phase 2. The Sounder line shown in the Phase 1 map goes south of Tacoma to Lakewood. However, Sounder south of Tacoma is now part of Phase 2.

Shouldn't Sound Transit now demonstrate that its first Central Link light rail passenger train system can be built on time and on budget, will be operated safely, and will attract the forecast number of passengers before asking citizens for its tax revenues to be doubled?

There are some recent hints in U.S. Government oversight reports that the Initial Segment of Link light rail may be getting into schedule and budget trouble, despite Sound Transit's assurances.

As further reinforcement for the notion of finishing Sound Move Phase 1 before moving forward on Phase 2, all of the projects specified in Sound Transit Phase 2 (ST2) for Sounder and Express Bus, as well as a substantial portion of the light rail segments to be constructed in Phase 2, are clearly already authorized by Sound Move. Compared to the light rail extensions of ST2, the Sounder and Regional Express portions are not very much money. All of these previously authorized parts of ST2 could advance in the 2007-2010 period without ST2 being approved, as well as the environmental review of ST2 projects such as Eastside Link.

How about Sound Transit at least finishing the Initial Segment of light rail, including its extension to the Sea-Tac Airport, before funding Sound Transit to the tune of $24 billion additionally, on top of the $15 billion the agency is already in the process of spending?

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